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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Ancillary Jurisdiction-The Third-Party ]Defendant's
Claim Under Federal Rule 14 (a)
"[A]ncillary jurisdiction-the child of necessity and sire of confu-
sion"1 will now support an impleaded third-party defendant's claim against
the original plaintiff without requiring an independent jurisdictional basis.
In Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,2 the
original defendant, surety on a performance contract, impleaded the con-
tractor under Federal Rule 14(a).' The contractor in turn asserted a
14(a) claim against the plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff was responsible
for the contractor's failure to complete construction on time. Since both
the third-party defendant and original plaintiff were Maryland corpora-
tions, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the impleaded party's claim for lack
of diversity of citizenship. The motion to dismiss was denied on the
ground that the third party's claim was considered ancillary to the
plaintiff's original claim. The ruling on the motion was certified for im-
mediate appeal,4 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the first
appellate court to review the jurisdictional requirements for the impleaded
third party's claim, held that no independent jurisdictional basis was re-
quired.'
Federal courts may resolve those claims over which they have no
subject-matter jurisdiction by invoking the concept of ancillary juris-
diction. The theory is that "a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case
' Note, Federal Practice: Jurisdiction of Third-Party Claims, 11 OKLA. L. Rnv.
326, 329 (1958).
'426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) in pertinent part states:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him .... The person served with the
summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party de-
fendant ... may ... assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff,
and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses. ...
'28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
426 F.2d at 717.
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or controversy as an entirety."' 6 In the settlement of the principal con-
troversy, claims may arise, which if sued upon alone, could not be
presented in the federal court for failure to meet the subject-matter juris-
dictional requirements. However, because the district court has juris-
diction over the principal claim, it may resolve those incidental matters
that are part of the entire controversy.
7
Initially the ancillary concept developed in response to necessity.8
However, necessity could hardly justify the doctrine as it exists today,
and the potential importance of the ancillary concept was not fully realized
until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with their liberal
joinder provisions.9 As the federal rules were applied, it became obvious
that the purpose of the liberal joinder provisions would be partially de-
feated if the courts would not give an expansive interpretation to the
ancillary jurisdiction concept.10 In fact, the purposes behind the joinder
provisions and the ancillary doctrine are indeed similar. Of prime con-
sideration are the factors of avoiding untimely delays in the settlement of
controversies, keeping the expense of litigation to a minimum, and in-
creasing convenience to parties and witnesses to the dispute. Then too
the avoiding of piecemeal litigation and the precluding of incongruous
results on basically the same factual situations are desired objectives. On
the other hand, Congress has clearly defined the jurisdiction of the
federal courts," and the purpose of the federal rules is certainly not to
extend this jurisdiction. 12 Undoubtedly, every time the ancillary doctrine
is applied, these congressional grants of authority are violated.
But is procedural convenience sufficient justification for the avoidance
of these grants of jurisdiction?" Apparently so, for the majority of courts
have held that the doctrine will support the compulsory counterclaim, 4
' C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT].
SId.
For example, if property was in the custody of the federal court, any person
having an interest in that property could assert his claim in that court without meet-
ing any jurisdictional requirements. To hold otherwise would have been to deny
those persons any forum, for the state court had no jurisdiction over property with-
in the custody of the federal system. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450,
460 (1860).
9 E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 18, 20.
oWRIGHT § 76, at 336.
"E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1964).
FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
I See WRIGHT § 9, at 20.
"E.g., United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prod., Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d
Cir. 1955); Mayer v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 165 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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the compulsory cross claim,' 5 the interpleader action,1 and the inter-
vention as of right.17 On the other hand, ancillary jurisdiction will not
support the permissive counterclaim,'" the permissive joinder of claims' 9
unless they are considered pendent,20 or permissive intervention.2' From
this empirical cross-section, it would appear that ancillary jurisdiction is
expanding to support any permissive claim so long as that claim is not
asserted by the original plaintiff in the action, and so long as the claim
arises from the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the original claim.22
If the concept of ancillary jurisdiction is expanding to support any
permissive claim arising out of the same transaction, it certainly has its
place under the third-party practice of rule 14(a). The concept was first
applied when the federal courts unanimously held that ancillary jurisdiction
would support the claim asserted against the impleaded third-party.2" The
theory used to justify this result is that "claim" as used by the federal
rules is broader in scope than the older legal phrase "cause of action"
"
8E.g., Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery, 180 F.2d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1950);
Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 228-29 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
"8 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) ; Haynes
v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 872-74 (5th Cir. 1957).
"E.g., Black v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 326 F.2d 603, 604 (10th Cir. 1964);
Fomulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 945 (1963).
8 Measurements Corp. v. Ferris Inst. Corp., 159 F.2d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 1947);
Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 226 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
" E.g., Delman v. Federal Prod. Corp., 251 F.2d 123, 126 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Wein-
traub v. Fitzgerald Bros. Brewing Co., 40 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
"'UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966) ; Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238,
246 (1933).
"E.g., Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, 212 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Olivieri v.
Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
2 That the claim must arise from the same transaction or occurrence has caused
considerable trouble. Initially claims were considered as coming from the same
transaction if they bore some logical relationship to one another. Moore v. New
York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). This relationship was said to exist
if "separate trials on each [claim] . . .would involve a substantial duplication of
effort and time by the parties and the courts." Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v.
Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961). The court in Revere
redefined this logical relationship by requiring either that the same set of operative
facts be the basis for both claims, or that the facts giving rise to the original claim
activate certain rights in the defendant that would have remained dormant. This
redefinition was certainly gratuitous for the claim being asserted in Revere would
have met even the initial test as one arising out of the same transaction. How-
ever, this new definition might be of some importance in considering the application
of ancillary jurisdiction to future claims.
"E.g., Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1965); Huggins v.
Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1964). See WRIGHT § 76, at 336.
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and means the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right en-
forceable in a court. 4 This claim gives rise to rights in the plaintiff against
the defendant and to rights in the defendant against third parties to the
action.25 The defendant's rights, therefore, against third parties are merely
a part of the aggregate of operative facts and thus should be considered
ancillary26
Once this third-party is impleaded, the original plaintiff may assert
any claim against him that arises "out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's [original] claim."127 But here
the courts have required an independent basis for federal jurisdiction"
reasoning that plaintiff could be manufacturing jurisdiction through
this third-party practice and through collusive joinder of parties could
circumvent "the diversity rule by use of a friendly original defendant. 112
This third-party also has a right under rule 14(a) to "assert any claim
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the plaintiff's [original] claim .... ."0 The juris-
dictional requirement for this particular claim was the problem before the
court in Revere. A conflict had developed at the district court level with
at least two cases supporting Professor Moore's proposition that an in-
dependent jurisdictional ground to support the impleaded party's claim
against the plaintiff was required.31 The language of rule 14(a) giving
"Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.
1943); IA W. BARRoN & A. HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 424,
at 653 (1960) [hereinafter cited as BARRoN & HOLTZOFF].
25 id.
"8 Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959), in which the court stated:
The great weight of authority amongst the federal district courts is to the
effect that when federal jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the main
action once attaches the court has ancillary jurisdiction to decide a third-
party dispute growing out of the same core of facts and hence within the
scope of the Rule even though the dispute, separately considered, is lacking
in the attributes of federal jurisdiction.
"'FEa. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
8 E.g., Friend v. Middle Atl. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946); Corbi v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 521, 522 (W.D.
Pa. 1969) ; WRIGHT § 76, at 337.2 Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 39 F. Supp. 305, 306 (E.D.N.Y.
1941) ; 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 14.27[1] (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as MooRE].
"FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
"Compare James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 178 F.
Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) and Shverha v. Maryland Cas. Co., 110 F. Supp. 173
(E.D. Pa. 1953) with Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
38 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965) and Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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rise to the third-party defendant's claim is substantially identical to that
describing plaintiff's assertion of a claim against the impleaded party,32
and Professor Moore reasons that because an independent jurisdictional
ground to support the plaintiff's claim is required, so too should there be
a requirement of this same independent jurisdictional basis to support the
impleaded party's claim against the plaintiff.33 In conjunction with Pro-
fessor Moore's argument is rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which states that "[t] hese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts . .. .- '
Such an interpretation, however, tends to be rather restrictive in light
of the policy behind the federal rules of settling as much in a single con-
troversy as is possible. As could be expected, therefore, a line of cases
began to develop at the district court level that did not require this
independent jurisdictional ground for the third-party claim against original
plaintiffs.35 These district courts chose to disregard the language upon
which Professor Moore relies. Rather the courts focused attention on the
reasons supporting different jurisdictional requirements for these ap-
parently identical claims.
To effectuate the purpose of rule 14(a), it would appear that a
reason must exist for not allowing ancillary jurisdiction to support the
claim. Regarding the original plaintiff's claim against the impleaded
third-party this reason is apparent; there exists the possible threat that
a plaintiff could manufacture jurisdiction through the use of a friendly
defendant.3" If no independent jurisdictional ground were required
for plaintiff's assertion of a claim against the third-party, circumvention
of jurisdictional requirements through abuse of rule 14(a) would be the
result, and the plaintiff would be able to invoke jurisdiction indirectly
when he could not have done so directly.37 On the other hand this same
threat of collusion does not exist in the claim asserted by the impleaded
82 See text accompanying notes 27 & 30 supra.
3 MooRE 14.27[2].
3 4 FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of
N. America, 178 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
" Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486
(D. Neb. 1965); Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30
F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederland-scheamerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 9 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
" See, e.g., authorities cited note 29 supra.
" Note, Federal Third-Party Practice-Ancillary Jurisdiction Supports Third-
Party Defendant's Claim Against Plaintiff, 8 UTAH L. REv. 145, 148 (1962). But
see Frazer, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts,
33 F.R.D. 27, 42 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Frazer]
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party, for the parties asserting these claims enter the lawsuit in different
postures. The plaintiff, in bringing the action submits "himself to all
claims arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the
litigation,"38 while "[t]he third-party defendant, on the other hand, is
before the court involuntarily, and in all fairness he ought to be able to
assert all claims arising out of the subject matter of the original action
which he may have against the plaintiff."' 9 Therefore, the policy considera-
tions supporting ancillary jurisdiction call for its application to support
the claim of the impleaded third-party against the plaintiff. Sufficient
differences exist between these claims and plaintiff's claims against the
third-party defendant to warrant different jurisdictional requirements.
Therefore, in Revere the court's extension of ancillary jurisdiction
was absolutely correct, but several problems are inherent in the decision
that need consideration. The first problem is how the plaintiff's response
to the impleaded party's claim is to be categorized. Logically the response
should be treated as a compulsory counterclaim under rule 13(a)40
which, according to a majority of courts, would be supported by ancillary
jurisdiction.41 But here again the plaintiff will have succeeded in manu-
facturing his jurisdiction. A second inevitable problem is whether the
threat of the collusive manufacturing of jurisdiction is so predominant as
to require the avoidance of all other policy considerations supporting rule
14(a).42 A pretrial agreement between the plaintiff and defendant to
implead a third party is undoubtedly remote,4" and such collusive align-
ment of parties to affect federal jurisdiction could be easily detected at the
8 Note, 11 OKLA. L. REv., supra note 1, at 328.
I' d.
'
0 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
,
1E.g., Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634
(3d Cir. 1961) ; United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prod., Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216
(2d Cir. 1955); 1A BARRON & HOLTZoFF § 392, at 548.
" Frazer at 42-43, where the author argues for an extension of ancillary juris-
diction to support plaintiff's claim against an impleaded party and concludes:
Once a third-party defendant is brought into an action the court should be
able to settle all claims arising out of the transaction that is the basis of the
action, and it should be immaterial which party asserts the claim because
the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation of disputes is as great whether
the claim is asserted by a defendant or by a plaintiff. The parties and the
facts are already before the court so that the burden on the court will not
be increased by holding that the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
defendant is ancillary.
, "That there may be collusion between the original parties in some cases
should not prevent plaintiffs from asserting claims against third-party defendants
in all cases. The courts should only dismiss the claim when collusion actually
exists." Id. at 42.
[Vol. 49
RIGHT TO RETAIN ARREST RECORDS
initial stages of trial.44 However, because of over-emphasis ol the threat
of jurisdictional collusion, precedent has developed requiring an in-
dependent jurisdictional ground.45 Therefore, the extension of ancillary
jurisdiction to cover the original plaintiff's claim against the impleaded
party is less certain but arguably necessary if effect is to be given the
policy behind the federal rules and if the courts are going to perform
their primary function of settling the entire dispute.
E. L. KITTRELL SMITH
Constitutional Law-Right of Police to Retain Arrest Records
The advent of the computer, proposals for a new National Data Bank,1
development of means for rapid and efficient interchange of information,
and highly publicized incidents of police and military surveillance have
crystallized public concern over the information retention activities of
government agencies. This developing wariness of records would seem
to germinate from their accelerated capacity for harm. At present, masses
of records may be conveniently stored in computers subject to almost
instantaneous recall. The data retained by one organization may be
expeditiously conveyed to another on request.' The total effect of these
technological advances is an increased potentiality for evil as well as good.
The accuracy and validity of records that are damaging in nature must,
therefore, be laboriously scrutinized if the interests of individuals are not
to be crushed by a newly mechanized bureaucracy.
A recent federal case, Menard v. Mitchell,3 outlined many of the
competing considerations involved in the right of the police to keep records
of arrests. The plaintiff brought an action seeking to compel the Attorney
General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Invest.gation to ex-
" At least another potential problem area has been avoided where the main
claim is dismissed leaving only the third-party defendant's claim which lacks an
independent jurisdictional base, for "[j]urisdiction once acquired is not lost by
changes in the situation leaving only ancillary matters for determination." 1A
BAR ON & HOLTZOFF § 424, at 658.
'" See note 29 supra.
'For an analysis of the advisability of a National Data Bank see generally J.
ROSENBERG, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ROSENBERG].
Id. 64-68.
'430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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punge records4 of his arrest and detention for burglary in California.'
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in reversing a sum-
mary judgment for defendants stated that the record was not sufficiently
complete to permit summary judgment and remanded for a trial on the
merits.
Since the court refused to surmise the actual nature of the facts in
the case, the opinion dealt extensively with the entire question of arrest
records. Appropriate dispositions were indicated for various hypothetical
fact situations. Basically four fact situations which may be arranged in
an order of ascending analytical complexity, are possible. An arrest may
be made: 1) without probable cause for purposes other than prosecution,
2) in good faith but without probable cause, 3) with probable cause but
further investigation proves exonerating, or 4) with probable cause but
the prosecutorial process is not invoked. The import of Menard lies in
the guidelines established for resolving the issue of the police right to
retain records in these various contexts.
Arrests made for purposes other than prosecution are essentially puni-
tive in nature.6 Such arrests are employed as a substitute for the full
criminal process when the criminal process is considered inappropriate
or unavailable. In particular, prostitutes and those who violate liquor and
gambling laws are vulnerable to arrests made on little or no actual evidence
for the purpose of harassing their operations.7 The Supreme Court in
United States v. Price,' stated that "[i]f the Fourteenth Amendment for-
bids denial of counsel, it clearly denounces denial of any trial at all.' The
court in Menard, relying on Price, severely questioned retention of records
of arrests made for the purpose of harassing an individual.' Such a prac-
tice would constitute a nonjudicial punishment in violation of due process.
The arrest record constitutes one aspect of the total punitive effect of an
arrest when made solely for the purpose of achieving that effect. There-
'The FBI retains these records pursuant to the statutory authorization in 28
U.S.C. § 534(a) (1) (Supp. IV 1965-69).
'The plaintiff was released under CAL. PENAL CODE § 849(b) (1) (West 1970).
'But see United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932), in which the
court contended that compiling police records cannot be characterized as punish-
ment.
'P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 219-35 (1969). Individuals may be arrested in
order to maintain a proper level of respect for law enforcement officials. Id. at 89-
98.
383 U.S. 787 (1966).
'Id. at 799.
10 430 F.2d at 494.
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fore, memoralization of arrests in this first category is constitutionally
defective for want of due process.
A strong constitutional argument may be made for precluding the
retention of records of any arrest not resulting from probable cause and
when probable cause never develops. A significant line of Supreme Court
decisions has proscribed the use of "fruits" of an illegal seizure. In
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States" the government was pre-
vented from using information gained by reviewing illegally seized docu-
ments. Davis v. Mississippi'2 prohibited the admission of fingerprints
secured as a result of an unlawful detention. Finally, Wong Sun v.
United States'" established that verbal testimony ascertained to be the
product of an unlawful arrest was inadmissible. In light of these cases
the consideration narrows to a question of whether a record of an illegal-
i.e., without probable cause-arrest is the "fruit" of that arrest.
Since an arrest record has no independent significance and simply
represents a transcription of the fact that an arrest occurred, a more direct
product of an arrest is difficult to imagine. Significantly, an arrest
record is employed primarily as an investigative aid-the precise use
prohibited by the Court.'4 Admittedly, the record could be used only in
investigation of subsequent criminal activity, but the prohibition estab-
lished by Silverthorne was not confined to use in a particular case or
point in time.'5 As a deterrent to illegal arrests, the police are restrained
from any use of the products of such arrests. To permit the police to
derive any benefit from an illegal arrest undermines the policy behind the
exclusionary rule.'
When an arrest with probable cause terminates in exoneration, basic
fairness would seem to preclude retention of a record. The court in Menard
alluded to this question by reference to the fact that certainly no record
could have been kept if an arrest had not occurred.' 7 The import of this
argument is that since the arrest resulted from a mistake, even though a
reasonable one, it should not have occurred. Consequently, the police
having initiated the mistaken arrest are under an obligation to restore the
11251 U.S. 385 (1920).
12394 U.S. 721 (1969).
13371 U.S. 471 (1963).
"See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
12251 U.S. at 392.
18See the rationale expressed concerning the exclusionary rule in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
17430 F.2d at 491.
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individual as much as is possible to his position previous to the arrest.,,
The only legitimate police interest in this situation is based solely upon
the need to maintain statistical data such as the number of arrests during
a certain month. To facilitate this purpose, it is unnecesary for the record
to disclose the identity of the individual. Administrative ease is not served
by requiring two sets of records, one involving the identity, and the other
not. Nevertheless, it would be inequitable to permit the police to take
advantage of even an honest mistake to the detriment of an individual,
administrative ease notwithstanding.
The most difficult problem concerns arrests resulting from probable
cause in which the suspect is released but not exonerated. There are two
facets to the resolution of this question. One concerns the dissemination
of arrest records to potential employers. But even if dissemination to
employers is not involved, a distinct problem remains as to whether the
mere presence of the arrest records in the police files impinges vital rights.
Because police records, particularly those of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, are subject to substantial dissemination,1" a person who
has an arrest record may be handicapped in seeking employment .2  This
potentiality raises an equal protection question to which the court in
Menard obliquely alluded.2' In ascertaining whether the right to keep
arrest records can withstand an attack based upon equal protection, the
nature of the right infringed is significant. The question is whether the
right is denominated as fundamental. In situations not involving funda-
mental rights, the government may make classifications so long as they
are not arbitrary.2  In such situations, those persons engaging in criminal
activity are placed in this classification based upon having an arrest record.
On the other hand, if fundamental rights are involved, the government
must justify its classification with a "compelling" interest.2 The Supreme
" For examples of liabilities that might result from an arrest record see Russell
v. United States, 402 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (refusal of personal recognizance) ;
Rhodes v. United States, 275 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1960) (government contended
bail should be denied).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1965-69), for the authorized extent of
dissemination. The ambiguity in the statutory phrase "other institutions" is clarified
somewhat in 430 F.2d at 492 n.33.
20 430 F.2d at 490 n.17.
2 [T]here is limit beyond which the government may not tread in devising
classifications that lump the innocent with the guilty." Id. at 492.
22 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); See also Karst, Invidious Dis-
crimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process
Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 716 (1969).
[Vol. 49
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Court in Levy v. Louisiaa24 held that the right to adjudicate a wrongful
death action involved the right of dependents to continued support and as
such was "fundamental."2 5 The analogy between the right of a family to
receive continued support and the right to obtain gainful employment to
provide similar support is clear. The inability to litigate a wrongful
death would constitute a complete destruction of the the right involved in
Levy. However, this aspect of Levy should not make the case dis-
tinguishable, even though the right to employment is only impaired by the
dissemination of an arrest record. Shapiro v. Thompso 26 involved no
more than an impairment of a right deemed fundamental-the right to
travel-and not its complete destruction.
The court in Menard did not overtly come to grips with Griswold v.
Comnecticut 7 and its implications in the police record context. In Griswold
the Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy beyond the bounds of
the enumerated protections"' and gave it an independent existence. The
"constitutionalization" of the right to privacy in Griswold may have
significant implications for the dissemination of police records. Under-
scoring this point is the fact that traditionally litigation concerning photo-
graphs and files maintained by the police was based upon the equitable
right to privacy.- Many of these cases involved "rogue's gallerys"
3 0
which because of their accessibility to the public compromised this basic
right.3 . While dispositions varied depending upon the significance given
the right in the particular jurisdiction, 2 these state court decisions were
pre-Griswold. The balancing of government and individual interests in
2,391 U.S. 68 (1968).
r Id. at 68-69.
2' 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2. 384 U.S. 479 (1965).
" The enumerated rights to privacy are found in U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, IV,
V. The right to association has been held to include the right to anonymity.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
"8 Cases cited note 32 infra.
80 "Rogue's gallerys" are collections of photographs of persons who the police
believe to have participated in criminal activity. These photographs are shown to
members of the general public when they are attempting to identify the culprit of
a crime.
" See, e.g., Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905) ; Itzkovitch
v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
8" Compare State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946),
Molineux v. Collins, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904), and Owen v. Partridge, 40
Misc. 415, 82 N.Y.S. 248 (1903) with State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426,
153 S.W.2d 834 (1941), and McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d
514 (1945).
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this area must now be reconsidered with cognizance being given to
Griswold.
The government's interest in dissemination to employers is to protect
employers from persons with criminal propensity. This interest is cer-
tainly less vital than the crime investigation interest which is not impaired
by curtailment of dissemination. Further, given the unreliability of arrest
records not resulting in conviction as an indicator of criminal propensity, 8
the government's interest could be characterized as weak indeed.
The court in Menard offered two suggestions for dealing with
the problem of injury to employment opportunities. First, the records
could be made more complete. It is doubtful, though, that even an arrest
record stating "released because of insufficient evidence" would have a
completely neutral effect upon an employer. The clear fact seems to be
that arrest records of any type adversely affect job opportunities.8 4 Even
in Menard the court, while suggesting the need for more completeness,
recognized the inherent difficulty in neutralizing arrest records8' The
other alternative-curtailment of dissemination-provides the only effec-
tive means of preventing arrest records from infringing upon the rights
of employment and privacy.
Even if arrest records are not disseminated, an argument can be made
that the presence of a record in the police files infringes the right to
privacy. A person with an arrest record is in a substantially different
position vis-A-vis the police than other citizens. When a crime occurs,
those persons with "records" are more likely to be investigated concerning
that crime and if suspected, more likely to be arrested."0 The increased
efficiency and rapidity with which information may be disseminated
among law enforcement entities and ultimately down to individual police-
men enhances the possibility that an arrest record will result in investiga-
tionY.7 To the extent that an arrest record stimulates greater police in-
volvement in the life of an individual, his privacy is diminished.
Despite an innate feeling that an arrest record somehow compromises
8 See text p. 517-18 infra.
" "Mere arrest may destroy reputation, or cause the loss of a job, or visit grave
injury upon a family." Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U.
CHI. L. REv. 427, 431 (1960).3 430 F.2d at 492-93.
8 Id. at 490-91. See also W. LAFAVE, ARREST 287-89 (1965), and E. WILLIAMS,
MODERN LA w ENFORCEMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 105-09 (1967), which con-
tain extensive analyses of reliance by the police upon information about past
criminal activity.8 ROSENBERG 64-68.
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privacy, it is difficult analytically to pinpoint the exact legal right invaded.
Since an arrest is a public act, a record of the event cannot by its existence
alone be an infringement upon privacy. Further, if the record influences
the police to make subsequent forays into a person's privacy, those acts
may be judged on their own merits. For example, a search, even though
it might not have been made in the absence of the suspect's record, may
be evaluated on the basis of its reasonableness at the time it occurred.3 8
A finding of reasonableness legitimatizes any invasion of privacy caused
by the arrest record. In short, it may be argued that the increased police
scrutiny resulting from an arrest record does not impugn privacy unless
the scrutiny itself is illegal. The legality of that scrutiny may be in-
dependently ascertained.
This contention, though compelling, it not completely persuasive. The
police certainly do not investigate, search, or arrest every time there is
legal justification to do so." An unreasonably retained arrest record
may constitute a significant criterion by which discretionary choices are
resolved. Therefore, even though the act is reasonable, the catalyst for
the act may not be. Arguably, an individual should be entitled to have
police discretion concerning even legitimate incursions into his private
life rest upon rational factors. The systematic introduction into the
decision-making process of an irrational factor, in the form of an un-
reasonably retained arrest record, would seem, therefore, to constitute an
infringement of the right to privacy. Further, a person has no remedy if
the police search or detain him on the basis of an arrest record, and then
release him. The fact that the subsequent act of invasion of privacy result-
ing from the record could theoretically be judged on its own merits becomes
unimportant since no opportunity would arise to determine its reasonable-
ness. The only realistic means of precluding these attacks on privacy is to
eliminate the inaccurate record from which they stem.
An emerging pattern of state and federal court decisions limiting
police surveillance' may also be relevant to police retention of criminal
records. The United States Supreme Court has for some time looked
disconsolately upon laws that exert a chilling effect on first amendment
"See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
" See Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 559-62
(1960).
"See, e.g., Bee See Books Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Hicks v. Knight, 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 1504, 1505 (E.D. La. 1965) (prohibiting
police from concealing identity).
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rights.4 A recent state court caseP and an older federal case48 extend to
police surveillance the same type of rationale that is behind the "chilling
effect" principle. These cases could portend important limitations upon
police practices adversely affecting speech and association when the state
interest is negligible or could be satisfied by a more circumscribed pro-
cedure.
The importance of this "chilling effect" doctrine is readily apparent
in cases of arrest resulting from activities within the realm of first amend-
ment applicability. An individual espousing viewpoints or participating
in associations that the police consider "suspect" might well carry on
these activities with far greater circumspection if he knew the police were
aware of what he was doing. An awareness by the police based upon an
arrest record for trespass during a "sit in," as an example, does not
seem dissimilar from an awareness based on surveillance or police pres-
ence. In each case, the individual is more visible to the police than other
persons. The individual's reaction to this enhanced visibility can inhibit
the vigorous exercise of first amendment rights. Consequently, retention
of the records of "political" arrests undermines a most crucial constitu-
tional prerogative.
A somewhat strained argument may be made that the reason for the
arrest does not affect the application of the "chilling effect" principle.
The apprehension caused by an arrest record results from a reaction to the
"E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
2 Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (1969), rezvd, 56 N.J.
210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). The trial court held unconstitutional as unduly inhibiting
first amendment rights a police procedure directed at gathering information about
lawful activity looking toward civil disturbances; the reversal was based, however,
to a significant extent upon the scantiness of the trial record and a belief that the
lower court's injunction suffered from overbreadth. 56 N.J. at 215, 231-32; 265
A.2d at 681, 687. In addition to the rather narrow grounds for reversal and re-
mand, the trial court decision remains important because of the validity of its
logic. The trial court's holding would, without reversal, have been quite limited
in its precedent effect. Therefore, the significance of the case is dependent on the
persuasiveness of its reasoning. The lower court's opinion has been commented
upon favorably in Askin, Police Dossiers and Energing Principles of First Amend-
inent Adjudication, 22 STAN. L. REv. 196 (1970); Schlam, Police Intimidation
Through "Surveillance" May be Enjoined as an Unconstitutional Violation of
Rights of Assembly and Free Expression, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 130 (1969);
Note, Constitutional Law--Illegality of Police Program to Gather Information on
Civil Disorders, 48 N.C.L. REv. 648 (1970).
'" Local 309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind.
1948), prohibited police attendance at a union meeting on the basis that such
presence would inhibit the union members' exercise of their first amendment free-
doms.
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potentiality for intensified police scrutiny. Consequently, the fact of
greater police awareness rather than its source is critical. Further, the
failure of an individual to exercise the full range of his first amendment
rights in the past does not justify a practice inhibiting their exercise in
the future. However, the cause and effect relationship between possessing
an arrest record for burgulary and refraining from unrelated associational
actvities is tenuous.
The fact that arrest records cannot be reconciled with certain in-
dividual rights does not give rise to an absolute prohibition of record
retention.44 The equal protection, privacy, and first amendment considera-
tions only indicate that there is something on the other side of the scales
against which the state interest must be balanced. The files maintained
by the police are used as a tool in the investigation of crime. Certainly, the
government's interest in criminal investigation is compelling. However,
this does not mean that the interest in keeping records of every arrest, even
those based on probable cause, is sufficient to overcome the individual's
interests. 5 The value of an arrest record as an investigative aid is based
upon two assumptions: 1) the individual arrested did, in fact, commit the
crime of which he is accused, and 2) his commission of this crime indicates
a propensity to commit subsequent crimes. To the degree that a particular
arrest record does not vindicate these assumptions, its value in police
investigation is reduced and the government's interest in it wanes. At some
point the government's interest is no longer sufficient to justify its in-
fringement upon individual rights.
In ascertaining the extent of the government's interest in a particular
case, the reason for the termination of the criminal process is critical. The
police or the prosecutor may decide not to attempt prosecution for any
number of legitimate reasons. Many of these reasons provide insights
into whether the assumptions warranting keeping arrest records are
founded in a particular case. If the evidence is insufficient to take the
case to trial,4" a record of such arrest would, at best, be of little value and
could prove misleading. A substantial number of cases are not prosecuted
"The court in the principal case refused plaintiff's motion for a summary
judgment. 430 F.2d at 490.
' See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). "[Wihen an
accused is acquitted of the crime or when he is discharged without conviction, no
public good is accomplished by the retention of criminal identification records." Id.
at 970.
"' This lack of evidence is one basis for release under CAL. PENAL CODE § 849
(b) (1) (West 1970).
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because the prosecuting witness withdraws his complaint.47 Many of these
cases involve marital spats and insignificant conflicts between individuals
who attempt to invoke the criminal process to salve injured feelings.48
It is very doubtful whether such minimal criminal activity indicates any
propensity to commit subsequent crimes. The same may be said for cases
in which the police department or prosecutor makes an independent
decision that the case is too trivial to be tried. These examples serve to
illustrate situations in which the state interest on balance is not very
compelling.
On the other hand, a failure to prosecute resulting, for example, from
the death or unavailability of a crucial witness would not preclude a
probability of actual guilt sufficient to necessitate keeping the record of
arrest.4" The overburdening of our court system may force prosecutors
into hard choices concerning which cases to take to trial. A release
resulting from inability to provide a speedy trial would not go to the
merits of the case. As can be seen, each case must rest upon its particular
facts. A single rule of generalized applicability is impossible. However,
at a minimum, the police should be prevented from accumulating records
on persons whose criminal activity is either very doubtful or insignificant.
The determination that certain criteria must be met for the retention
of arrest records to .be permitted is not alone sufficient. If the decision
as to whether the standard has been satisfied simply becomes another aspect
of the police and prosecutorial discretion, any protection for the right of
privacy would be illusory. It is enlightening to note the means used to
protect another constitutionally founded personal right. The police are
required by inferences from the specific language in the fourth amend-
ment to establish before an independent magistrate the necessity of search-
ing a man's home.5" The reason for this requirement is the inability of
the police to objectivity balance the competing interests." In addition,
since the intrusion is a product of police activity, the police are required
to sustain the burden of justification and initiate the process for judicial
determination. The same rationale could support a requirement that an
independent magistrate decide when the police may retain arrest records.
The ease with which records of even insignificant value may be main-
"' Note, Prosecntor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1068 (1955).
I Id. at 1069.
"Id. at 1068.
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
1In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Supreme Court held the police
affidavit supporting a search warrant insufficient to establish probable cause.
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tained would mitigate in favor of the police considering virtually all
arrest records essential. An opportunity for a collateral attack upon the
police discretion would be beyond the means of most individuals and,
consequently, would not constitute a viable remedy. A procedure similar
to that used in issuing search warrants would serve the dual purpose of
providing objectivity and alleviating the necessity of the individual taking
the initiative in protecting fundamental rights. In addition, a high vis-
ibility decision-making process would facilitate judicial establishment of
standardized guidelines by which the close cases could be resolved. Ad-
mittedly, this procedure is not demanded by the language of the constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, the courts have traditionally been willing to require
particular procedures when it is apparent they are essential to insure
constitutionally protected rights. 2
Constantly expanding capacity to secure and maintain massive quan-
tities of data on individuals has placed the right to privacy on the cutting
edge of the law. Menard represents the beginning of more intense judicial
involvement in this area. However, a definitive demarcation by appellate
courts of the boundaries of police rights in the record retention context
is critical.
Coy E. BREWER, JR.
Constitutional Law-The North Carolina Public Assistance Lien Law
and Current Constitutional Doctrine
"Beneficient provisions for the poor, the unfortunate and orphan [is]
one of the first duties of a civilized and Christian state. . . ."I Such was
the philosophy of "welfare" when the framers wrote the North Carolina
Constitution of 1868. By mid-twentieth century, however, the "benef-
icence" associated with public assistance in North Carolina was sharply
curtailed for some groups among the poor. The change came with the
enactment of North Carolina's first "welfare lien" laws.2 For the first time
in the state's history, public assistance was conditioned on eventual repay-
ment through statutory liens on real property.'
"'An excellent example of a procedure established by the courts to secure a con-
stitutionally based right is that outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'N.C. CONsT. art. XI, § 7 (1868).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-29 to -37.1 (Supp. 1969).
'As recently as 1969, thirty-three other states had some type of repayment pro-
visions under federal-state funded programs. While such provisions are not required
1971]
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Though there is a dearth of literature and case law on North Carolina's
lien laws,4 some of the federal constitutional doctrine that has evolved
within the last two or three decades is highly relevant to the North Caro-
lina statute and its administration. It is significant that the statute has
never been challenged on constitutional grounds and that lien laws
throughout the nation have generally escaped such a fate. The poverty
of the potential litigants and their lack of adequate representation have
made them for the present, at least, part of a silent minority. The important
issues confronting North Carolina welfare legislation, however, can be
highlighted by a brief examination of developing constitutional doctrine
as it has related to other lien laws, welfare legislation generally, and allied
fields.
In Snell v. Wyman5 the United States Supreme Court affirmed with-
out opinion a three-judge district court decision rejecting a challenge to
the New York repayment law. Under the New York law, a person other-
wise eligible for public assistance who owns real or personal property is
deemed to have an "implied contract" with the welfare department for the
full amount of assistance rendered.6 Among the four plaintiffs in Snell
was a nineteen-year-old mother with three children receiving AFDC pay-
ments. In 1967 she was involved in an auto accident, and as a condition to
her continued receipt of public assistance, she was required to execute an
"assignment of proceeds of lawsuit." This document served to assign the
proceeds of her personal injury claim to the Department of Social Services.
Another plaintiff whose income was eighty-six dollars per week, and who
was also receiving AFDC to help support his eight children, suffered per-
sonal injuries in the public housing project where he lived and was forced
to quit his job. In 1967 this plaintiff received four hundred dollars from
the New York City housing authorities as compensation for his injury,
by the states, and while the original Social Security Act was silent on state re-
imbursement, Congress has acquiesced to those states requiring repayment and now
provides that a proportionate amount of money collected shall go to the federal
government. HEW, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UN-
DER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, PUBLIC AssISTANCE REPORT No. 50 (1964 ed.).
'See R. Ligon, North Carolina Old Age Assistance Lien Law, March, 1960(unpublished study located at the Institute of Gov't, Chapel Hill, N.C.).
393 U.S. 323 (1969) (per curiam), aF'g, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).6 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 104 (McKinney 1966).
281 F. Supp. at 857. The Attorney General of North Carolina has stated that
although proceeds from a wrongful death action are not "assets" of an estate under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173, if the judgment of the court in a criminal prosecution
for manslaughter directs that an amount of money be paid an administrator of the
deceased-recipient, those funds do become assets of the estate that can be applied
to an assistance claim. See R. Ligon, mpra note 4, at 32.
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but these funds were soon exhausted. The Department of Social Services
required endorsement over of one of three disability insurance checks and
asserted a "notice of lien" in the amount of 420 dollars for assistance
furnished after the accident.8 In addition to the liens on potential or actual
recoveries for personal injuries, liens on an interest in real property and
on an assignment of the interest of an insured recipient in life insurance
policies were also involved. 9
The plaintiffs argued that the repayment provisions were "arbitrary,
oppressive, and irrational," that the state was defeating its own announced
objective of seeking to make welfare recipients productive and self-support-
ing, and that the laws were contrary to the plaintiffs' own desires for
human dignity and independence. They also argued that the state's only
"conceivable rationale" for these laws was to save money but pointed out
that in 1966 of 1,200,000,000 dollars spent for public aid, only 5,000,000
dollars was recovered through liens.10
In rejecting the due process arguments, the three-judge court stated
that it could hold the statutes unconstitutional only if it were invested with
a power under the due process clause to invalidate state laws on the basis
that they might be "improvident" or "unwise."'" Yielding to the Supreme
Court's traditional nonintervention policy in cases in which the major
impact is "economic," the court said:
[I]t is not for federal judges to be "liberal" or "conservative" in ad-
vancing and ordering measures which undoubtedly related to basic
matters of human decency .... The constricted test in this forum is
one of minimal rationality. 12
Plaintiffs also argued that they were denied equal protection since the
state supplied many benefits for which it did not seek repayment and dis-
criminated between those who had property and those who did not. With
equal finesse the court blunted these arguments:
Like the life of the law generally, the Fourteenth Amendment was not
designed as an exercise in logic. It is ancient learning by now that a
classification meets the equal protection test "if it is practical, and is
not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary."' 3
' 281 F. Supp. at 858.
0Id. at 860.
20 Id. at 861 n.16.
" Id. at 862.
2 Id. at 863.
" Id. at 865. The California Supreme Court has held that the estate of a daugh-
ter could not be held liable for the mother's care at a state mental institution. The
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Snell is significant because it is patently inconsistent with most of the
equal protection standards established by the Supreme Court during the
past quarter century, sometimes referred to as the "new" equal protection.14
Where the impact of legislation has fallen on fundamental social concerns."5
as opposed to purely economic relations, the Court has demanded a close
analysis of several elements, including the legitimacy of the classification
established by the law, the relationship between the classification and the
purpose that the state is trying to promote, and finally, the validity of the
state's purpose itself."6 Professor Karst has summarized the constitutional
effect of the new equal protection:
What emerges from the new equal protection cases is an extremely
flexible sliding scale for measuring the required degree of intensity
state's attempt to recover was deemed a denial of equal protection in that "the cost
of maintaining the state's institution, including the provision of adequate care for
its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in society." Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1965). For general commentary on welfare lien laws see Graham, Public
Assistance: The Right to Receive; The Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 451
(1968); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings At-
tached, 54 CALIF. L. Rnv. 443 (1966); Comment, Snell v. Wyman and the Col-
stitutional Issues Posed by Welfare Payments Provisions, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 177
(1969). For a biting attack on various state lien laws, in which the North Caro-
lina statute is criticized, see SOUTH: TODAY, July-August, 1970, at 4.
' See Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in
Public Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within A
State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 787 (1968); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 716 (1969).
"- Outside the area of free expression, the Supreme Court has labeled the follow-
ing as "fundamental" rights: voting, education, procreation, marriage, fairness in
the criminal process, and the right to travel. Karst, supra note 14.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970), the Court declared welfare
benefits a matter of "statutory entitlement" for those qualified. Justice Brennan,
writing for the court, rejected the idea that public assistance was a mere charity,
emphasizing that it was a "means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity."' Judge Frankel, writing
for the three-judge court in S*nell recognized that the "primitive needs of desperate
people" is a different matter than purely economic concerns but refused to give
such a difference constitutional distinction. The court added that its decision was
in no way to be construed that welfare was not a "right" coming within the scope
of the fourteenth amendment. 281 F. Supp. at 863 n.19.
" In cases in which classifications have been based on race, wealth or some
other nonvoluntary status, the Supreme Court has insisted on a tight connection
between the challenged legislation and the state's objective. A mere "rational"
nexus is clearly insufficient. In such cases involving "fundamental" rights, the
court will also weigh the state interests carefully, even if they concededly have
validity. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
[Vol. 49
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LIEN LAW
of judicial scrutiny of the legislative classification .... The more the
victims of legislative classification appear to be disadvantaged, the less
need there is for their interests to be basic .... The result .. .is not
that the claim of constitutional right is absolute, but that it will prevail
unless it is outweighed by a strong showing of justification by the
state.17
The court in Snell clearly chose not to conform to the new equal pro-
tection formula,' 8 though that formula has been adhered to in other cases
dealing with welfare issues.' 9 The inconsistencies that mark this area of
the law, as well as other more stable constitutional doctrines, have im-
portant ramifications for the North Carolina welfare lien law.
North Carolina's first welfare lien law was created in 1951, but it
applied only to aged persons receiving assistance.20 In 1963 the General
Assembly adopted a similar law applicable to those receiving aid under the
permanently and totally disabled category,2 ' and in 1969 the lien laws were
amended and consolidated without significant change.2" Assistance to those
aged or disabled persons who owned any real property was conditioned on
their agreeing to a lien for the amount of assistance which they might
receive, while aid under the other federally and locally funded programs
remained unconditional. 3 At the termination of the recipient's aid or at his
death, the county department of social services determines the amount of
real property owned by the recipient including that acquired subsequent
to the lien; the department also determines if the recipient owns personal
property worth over one hundred dollars. In the event the recipient or his
estate satisfies either of these requisites, the county department prepares
a report, and the county attorney then enforces the lien."' Unlike the New
" Karst, supra note 14, at 744-45.
1 In another case involving the state's discretion in allocating welfare funds,
the Court recognized that public assistance "involves the most basic economic needs
of human beings" but followed Snell in applying minimum rationality standards.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
10 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-30.1 (1966).
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-73.12a (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-20 to -37.1 (Supp. 1969).
"Recipients of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC), Aid to the Blind (AB),
and those receiving "general assistance" money are unaffected by the lien laws.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-36, -37 (Supp. 1969). The liens are renewable pro-
vided the recipient continues to receive public assistance and an additional state-
ment is filed and properly indexed. Once the assistance terminates the lien is not
renewable, and no action may be brought to enforce the lien more than ten years
after the last day on which assistance was paid nor more than three years after
1971]
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York lien statute, .which provides for an implied contract between the
department of social services and the recipient, the North Carolina law
places a "general claim and a lien" on the real property of the person. The
state courts have held that when the recipient dies the claim must first be
satisfied from personal property in the same manner other claims against
the estate are satisfied. When the personal property is insufficient, the real
property is sold to satisfy the obligation.25
Whether the North Carolina statute as presently administered could
withstand the Court's rigorous scrutiny under the "new" equal protection
doctrine, or even meet some of the relaxed standards as expressed in Snel
is open to debate. While the Supreme Court has said that where the state
regulates or interferes with fundamental freedoms, " '[p] recision of reg-
ulation must be the touchstone,' "26 the major infirmity of the North
Carolina law rests in its lack of precision, both in framing and admin-
istration.
It is significant that the majority in Snell recognized the need for some
precision with regard to the nature of the property that could be subject
to the liens. Acknowledging that there are administrative qualifications
upon the state's right to recover, the court pointed out that except in cases
of fraud, no reimbursement is sought from property acquired by earnings
after a recipient has gone off welfare. The fact that such earnings are
exempted, in the words of the court, "leave wholly unfettered the desire and
search for independence through gainful work."' 2T The New York statute
was designed to catch primarily "windfall" property, i.e., any property not
"gainfully earned."
the date of the recipient's death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-33 (Supp. 1969). No en-
forcement is possible as long as the recipient, or after his death his surviving
spouse, dependent minor child, or dependent adult child with a mental or physical
disability (and incapable of self-support) is occupying the property as a home-
site. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-34 (Supp. 1969).
"' Brunswick County v. Vitou, 6 N.C. App. 54, 169 S.E.2d 234 (1969). The
Attorney General has given his opinion that the former old age assistance lien did
not apply to property held by the entirety, although it does apply to tenancies in
common. See Letter from Attorney General to W.E. Bateman, subject: S.M.
Woodley, 89-448-1249; Assistance Lien; Tenancy by the Entirety; Tenancy in
Common; dated 24 May 1967. (On file at the Institute of Gov't, Chapel Hill,
N.C.). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-31 (Supp. 1969), makes the filing of the lien "due
notice" to the recipient of the obligation against his real property.
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965), quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
"7281 F. Supp. at 862. Judge Kaufman, dissenting in Snell, was dissatisfied
with the majority's view that the administrative qualifications were adequate,
choosing not to discern merely between property "gainfully earned" and other
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LIEN LAW
The North Carolina statute makes no distinction between "windfall"
and earned property but subjects all property, earned or otherwise ac-
quired, to the claim or lien.2" The only "precision" required by North
Carolina is that personal property be exhausted before realty, and that
mandate is not even statutory.2 9 The rationale for North Carolina's lack
of precision in determining which property is susceptible would seem to be
that those who are aged or permanently and totally disabled no longer
enjoy an "earning capacity" at the time they receive public assistance,
and that there is only a minimal chance that such persons will gainfully
earn any property after receiving aid. This does not, however, explain
the consequences of the liens upon property gainfully earned before the
relief is sought.
The administration of the welfare lien in North Carolina is left almost
totally in the hands of the counties, and the county attorneys enforce the
law at the appropriate time. There is evidence that enforcement throughout
the state is not uniform and that in at least one county the lien laws are
not enforced at all.30 An amendment to the law in 1969 gave the Boards
of County Commissioners discretionary power to release any lien if, in
its opinion, such a release would result in a larger net recovery for the
county, state and federal governments." It is clear that unevenness of
administration raises constitutional questions even under "traditional"
equal protection notions.
The Supreme Court has held that a state, in deciding whether laws
shall operate statewide or only in selected territories, has great latitude. 2
Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional requirement, and the legis-
lature is free to determine priorities for its local subdivisions. 3 Such broad
discretion applies to welfare payments, and the state may allocate its
resources as it sees fit provided there is a rational basis. 4 A state, how-
ever, may not "purposefully" discriminate in applying an otherwise uniform
law. The constitutional principle was set out in Snowden v. Hughes:
35
property. He suggested that the guide for the welfare officials should not be
the "mere availability of some property but a genuine ability to repay without
sacrificing the basic incidents of self-support." Id. at 873.
_ N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 109-29, -35 (Supp. 1969).
"- See text preceding note 25 supra.
"Yancey County has not enforced the lien law since 1958 according to one
social services official. "Local politics" was the only explanation given.
= N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-37.1 (Supp. 1969).
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
Id. at 552.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
321 U.S. 1 (1944).
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The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its
face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to
be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown
to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to
a particular class of persons .. or it may only be shown by extrinsic
evidence showing a discriminatory design to favor one individual or
class over another not to be inferred from the action itself.3 6
Since Szowden the Court has stated that "discrimination-in-fact" is
bad even when it "reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action."137 This would apparently condemn inefficient or haphazard admin-
istrative action, even if not intentionally discriminatory.8 There has been
some suggestion that even purposeful and apparently rational variations
within a state may be subject to closer scrutiny if the interests involved
are "fundamental":
Even though . . . territorial variations may not always constitute a
denial of equal protection there may be less justification for such a
permissive attitude where interests such as education are involved.
To be constitutional variations of this kind have to be shown to be
essential to some overriding state interest.8 9
An equally important question connected with the "new" equal pro-
tection doctrine, and one which involves the North Carolina statute, is the
determination of when the judiciary will look behind the "purpose" of the
legislation to analyze the "motives" of the legislature. Early constitutional
doctrine shunned looking to the "motives" of Congress, as this was deemed
a violation of the separation of powers principle.40 In later years, however,
the Supreme Court has at least given a hard look at the underlying pur-
pose if not the motives behind some legislation, namely that serving to
maintain school segregation4 1 or foster racial discrimination in voting.
2
" Id. at 8, citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
"' J. Skelly Wright, writing for the District Court for the District of Columbia,
has denied that deliberate discrimination is essential for a violation of equal pro-
tection. "[G]overnment action which without justification imposes unequal burdens
or awards unequal benefits is unconstitutional." Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967).
8 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065, 1096
(1969).
,Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
'x See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LIEN LAW
The ostensible purpose of the North Carolina lien law is to reimburse
county and state treasuries for aid to the aged and disabled, thus allowing
more qualified poor persons to receive assistance. However, a brief review
of some of the statistics supplied by the Department of Social Services casts
doubt on this assumption.43 For the period beginning July 1, 1970, and
ending December 31, 1970, the net collection for all North Carolina coun-
ties reporting lien collections was 234,354 dollars. Fifty-two out of one
hundred counties collected old age assistance liens, and thirty-eight col-
lected disability liens during this period. From the total, the amount
returned to the federal government was 186,167 dollars, or nearly eighty
per cent. The state and counties then split the remainder equally-24,093
dollars going to the state treasury and an average of 395 dollars left
for each of sixty-one counties, the total number of counties reporting lien
collections.44
Contrasting the total contributions to the two programs by the state
and the counties with the lien reimbursements during the six month
period, the latter appears miniscule. According to the Department of
Social Services, the total amount expended by the state and counties for
the period was 6,655,022 dollars for the two assistance programs.4 5 Thus,
the total liens collected comprised only 3.5 per cent of the amounts ex-
pended by the state and counties for public assistance; but since eighty per
cent of that amount collected was returned to the federal treasury, only
0.72 per cent expended by the state and counties was actually recouped
by them through the liens.
The conclusion to be drawn from an overview of the statistics is that
reimbursement is not the only or perhaps not even the major reason for
the continuation of the liens. The federal government and the taxpayers
in all fifty states are the benefactors of lien collections in North Carolina.
Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curinm, 368 U.S. 515
(1962).
" Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiacm, 336 U.S.
933 (1949). See generally Developments in the Law-Equat Protection, supra
note 39, at 1091-1101.
" The statistics appearing herein were made available upon request from the
Finance and Budget Section of the Department of Social Services, Raleigh, North
Carolina.
"Nine of the thirty-eight counties reporting collections of disability liens did
not collect old age liens. Attorneys' fees for the collection of the liens totaled
37,698 dollars over the six-month period, well over 100 percent of the total amount
returned to the counties that enforced the claims.
" 3,342,802 dollars were expended on old-age assistance and 3,312,219 dollars
on aid to the disabled. The state and counties each contributed fifty percent of the
total.
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The only fair deduction is that the liens are intended to deter the aged
and permanently and totally disabled from seeking public assistance. In
view of the fact that welfare assistance is now regarded as a "statutory
entitlement"46 instead of a charitable privilege it is questionable whether
such deterrence is constitutionally permissible. Even by rational standards,
classifying the aged and the disabled into such a category would hardly
stand analysis if deterrence is in fact a purpose behind the laws. It is
significant in this regard that those receiving "general assistance" in
North Carolina are persons ineligible for one of the federally-supported
categorical public assistance programs, and all of the funds for general
assistance must be raised at the county level at the discretion of the county
commissioners.4 ' Though the need for reimbursement would seem critical
at the local level no lien laws are applicable. Clearly, if North Carolina's
primary purpose in enforcing the lien is to provide reimbursement, the
present law is wholly unsatisfactory.
A narrow reading of recent judicial decisions would indicate that
welfare repayment laws, at least in the short run, will remain immune
from attack by the courts. A broader view of recent equal protection doc-
trine, however, both in the welfare field and in other areas where dis-
advantaged persons and fundamental rights are concerned, suggests that
such immunity may not endure.4 North Carolina's statute is vulnerable to
an attack under the new equal protection doctrine because of the im-
precision in its composition, the lack of uniformity in its enforcement and
the failure of the state to achieve its purported purpose. An analysis of
the statute and its administration lead to the conclusion not only that its
provisions raise constitutional questions but that its preservation is due
to political expediency rather than fiscal responsibility.
GARBER A. DAVIDSON, JR.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
'
7 M. Thomas, Jr., A Guide To Social Services in North Carolina 34 (1970).
The author cites authority for the fact that North Carolina was forty-first in the
nation in 1968 in per capita annual income and that there are many needy people
who are ineligible because they do not meet all of the qualifications established.
He gives as an example a father earning sixty dollars per week who is living in
the home with his wife and six children. His children are ineligible for AFDC
because they have not been deprived of parental support. Id. at 32.
"'But see Wyman v. James, 39 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1971), in which
the court rejected a fourth amendment challenge to a New York regulation which
requires home visits as a condition for receiving assistance. This decision may
portend a movement away from the "new" equal protection approach in welfare
cases.' But cf. Note, Poverty Law-Is a Search Warrant Required for Home
Visitation by Welfare Officials? 48 N.C.L. REv. 1010 (1970) (author reached a
contrary conclusion in writing on the court of appeals decision).
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CONTROL OF PESTICIDES
Environmental Law-Control of Pesticides: Proposals for a New Law
in North Carolina
Increasing disquietude over the use of pesticides-growing ever since
the publication of Rachel Carson's SILENT SPRING in 1962-has recently
plunged conservation, wildlife, agricultural and industrial organizations
as well as federal and state agencies into an uproar. A flurry of resolu-
tions, proposals, solutions, hearings, law suits and legislation has ensued.
Some conservationists would have us believe that unless pesticides are
completely banned, we are faced with destruction. On the other hand,
those who advocate pesticide use claim that without free use of pesticides
we will certainly starve. Pesticide use appears to be on the increase1 and
voluminous studies on the various aspects of pesticides conducted by agri-
cultural, scientific and environmental concerns across the country all point
to the fact that pesticides, in some way, are affecting our environment.'
Chlorinated hydrocarbons, or persistent pesticides, form the principle
arena of the pesticide use/abuse controversy. It is ironic that DDT, a
member of this family, often a focal point of the furor and condemned by
many as an ecological disaster, was once hailed as a miracle chemical.3
Other members of this notorious group are DDE and TDE (metabolites
of DDT), endrin, aldrin, dieldrin, heptachlor, chlordane, toxaphene and
lindane4 These chemicals share four characteristics that distinguish them
from less controversial pesticides: 1) they do not break down rapidly
under natural conditions but remain in the environment for long periods,
1 There are currently more than sixty thousand pesticide formulations registered
for sale in the United States. S. BLOOM & S. DEGLER, PESTICIDES AND POLLUTION
4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BLOOM & DEGLER]. The amount of money spent by
farmers for pesticides has grown at the rate of fifteen per cent a year since 1950
(from eighty-seven million dollars to over one billion dollars in 1968). In 1968,
farmers spent 3.65 dollars per acre on pesticides. By 1975, this figure is expected
to rise to eight to nine dollars per acre. Consumer sales for pesticides, estimated at
1.7 billion dollars in 1968, should reach by 1975 the three-billion-dollar mark.
CHEMICAL WEEx, April 12, 1969, at 38. The United States produced 1,050 pounds
of pesticidal chemicals during 1967. BLOOM & DEGLFR 1.
2 For extensive bibliographies of these studies, see HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMMISSION ON PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH, pts. I & II (1969) [hereinafter cited as MRAK REPORT].
' Rogers, The Persistent Problem of the Persistent Pesticides: A Lesson in
Envirounental Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 567, 574 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Persistent Pesticides]; MRAK REPORT 44-46.
' MRAI REPORT 8-9; E. Bricklemyer & M. Heath, Regulation of Pesticides in
the United States 2 (1970) (on file at the Institute of Government, Chapel Hill,
N.C.); Environmental Clearinghouse, Inc., Memorandum on Pesticides, July,
1970.
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i.e., they are nonbiodegradable; 2) they tend to be toxic in some degree
for any form of life; 3) they are selectively stored in animal tissues; and
4) they are easily transported through the environment., Damage to
several species of birds, fish and wildlife has been documented,' but
much of the research is incomplete, and little is known of the long term
effects of pesticides on man.' The problem is not only what to do, but
what can be done, and how to do it. This note will briefly discuss federal
regulation in the field of pesticides, the existing legislation in North Car-
olina for pesticide control and the recommendations of the North Carolina
Legislative Research Commission for new regulation.8
FEDERAL REGULATION
The major vehicle for federal pesticide regulation is the Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),0 which requires
registration of any product sold in interstate commerce that is classified as
an "economic poison."' The registration process is conducted by the
'Remarks of Dr. Don W. Hayne reported in Hearings on the Use and Control
of Pesticides Before the Subcommittee on Pesticides of the Legislative Research
Commission, 1969 N.C. Gen. Ass'y at 3 (Jan. 23, 1970) (this report and all other
hearings are on file at Institute of Government, Chapel Hill, N.C.).
Perhaps the most frightening characteristic of persistent pesticides involves
the process of biological magnification, wherein the concentration of pesticide
residue in an animal's tissues is considerably higher than the concentration in the
food it eats. Humans, for example, store DDT in fat tissues at a concentration of
approximately eleven parts per million (ppm) (three to four ppm on basis of
whole body weight). This same DDT is concentrated in the total human diet at
about 0.1 ppm-thus, magnification of about thirty-five fold. Id. at 5.
A startling illustration of the sometimes damaging results of biological mag-
nification occurred in 1957 in California when Clear Lake was sprayed for gnat
control with DDT at a maximum concentration of 0.02 ppm. The magnification
proceeded through plankton, plankton-eating fish, carnivorous fish and fish-eating
birds. It was discovered later when grebes began dying at an alarming rate that
these birds contained a concentration of up to 1,600 ppm DDT and that some
fish had built up over 2,275 ppm of DDT in their fat, a magnification of 100,000.
Hearings on the Use and Control of Pesticides Before the Subcommittee of
Pesticides of the Legislative Research Commission, 1969 N.C. Gen. Ass'y at 57
(March 20, 1970).
6 MRAK REPORT 177-228.
Id. 229-458.
These recommendations are based on hearings conducted by the commission.
Hearings on the Use and Control of Pesticides Before the Subcommittee on Pesti-
cides of the Legislative Research Commission, 1969 N.C. Gen. Ass'y (Jan. 23,
1970; March 20, 1970; April 17-18, 1970; May 22, 1970; June 4, 1970; June
10, 1970; July 11, 1970) [hereinafter respectively cited as January Hearings,
March Hearings, April Hearings, May Hearings, June 4 Hearings, June 10 Hear-
ings, and July Hearings].
9 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1964).
"An economic poison is defined as "(1) any substance or mixture of sub-
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Pesticides Regulation Division of the United States Department of Agri-
culture (USDA)." Besides submitting fairly detailed information for
registration, manufacturers must devise an appropriate label for the
product. 12 Although registration applications are reviewed by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), the Public Health Service, the De-
partment of the Interior (USDI) and, since 1964, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), these agencies' participation
is in an advisory capacity only.13 The statute provides for seizure where
products have been adulterated, misbranded, unregistered or insufficiently
labeled and for criminal fine or imprisonment as an additional enforce-
ment method. 4 Supplementing the FIFRA is the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act (FDCA) which requires that the Secretary of HEW establish
tolerances for residues from registered pesticides in food products.' 5
After public outcry following the April, 1969, seizure of twenty-eight
thousand pounds of salmon containing DDT in excess of established
tolerance levels, the Secretary of HEW formed a commission to study
pesticides.' 6 The result was the well-known Mrak Report, containing
recommendations urging various corrective action at the federal level in
order to provide more adequate controls for sale and use of pesticides.'
stances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects,
rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds, and other forms of plant or animal life or viruses,
except viruses on or in living man or other animals, which the Secretary shall
declare to be a pest, and (2) any substances or mixture of substances intended for
use as a plant regulator, defoliant or desicant." 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1964).
I' BLOOM & DEGLER 39. Recent reorganization has placed responsibility for all
laws relating to pesticides in a new Environmental Protection Agency.
12 For a list of these requirements, see id. 41-43.
" Id. 39. Because of this lack of veto power, hundreds of pesticides have been
registered over the objections of HEW. Persistent Pesticides at 570, citing HousE
Comm. ON GOv'T OPERATIONS, DEFICIENCIES IN ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL
INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE AND RODENTICIDE ACT, H.R. No. 637, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
14 (1969).
1"7 U.S.C. §§ 135f, g (1964).
"221 U.S.C. §§ 341-348 (1964). Significant FDCA amendments are the Miller
Amendment of 1954 (21 U.S.C. § 364a, b (1964)), allowing condemnation of agri-
cultural commodities if they contain a residue not exempted or in excessive amounts;
and the "Delaney" Clause (21 U.S.C. § 348c(3) (A) (1964)), permitting no material
in food capable of causing cancer. Enforcement of the FDCA has also been trans-
ferred to the Environmental Protection Agency. See note 10 supra.
" Persistent Pesticides at 567. For full title of the commission and its report, see
note 2 supra.
" The more important of the commission's fourteen comprehensive recommenda-
tions include: eliminating all uses of DDT and DDD within two years, except those
essential to preservation of human health or welfare; requiring unanimous ap-
poval of USDA, USDI, and HEW of any registration, restricting or eliminating
any pesticide use deemed hazardous by one; restricting other persistent pesticides
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In response to the Mrak recommendations, the USDA announced on
November 20, 1969, the cancellation of registrations for any products
containing DDT for uses on shade trees, tobacco, around the home and by
persons other than public officials in aquatic areas and wetlands.1 8 Whether
the Mrak Commission recommendations will ever be effectively instituted
remains to be seen. 9 Meanwhile, several conservation groups have taken
matters into their own hands by instituting legal actions aimed at various
problems of pesticide control and use.20
CURRENT NORTH CAROLINA LAW
In addition to federal controls, all of the states, including North
Carolina, have enacted some form of pesticide legislation. Adapted from
a model act, the North Carolina Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (IFRA) 2 ' is administered by the State Department of Agriculture
and, like the federal act, provides for registration of any "economic
poisons"2 and deems it unlawful for any person to sell an unregistered,
to uses that present no known hazard to human health or environmental quality;
improving coordination and direction of the elements of HEW concerned with
pesticides; creating a pesticides advisory committee to evaluate data on the hazards
of pesticides to human health and environmental quality; developing standards
for pesticide content in food, water and air that will protect the public from undue
hazards; increasing federal support of research on all methods of pest control;
and developing model regulations for collection and disposal of unused pesticides,
containers and other contaminated materials. MRAK REPORT 7-19.
" The department also declared an intent to cancel any other use of DDT un-
less it is shown that a particular use is essential to protect human health and that
there is no effective and safe substitute. 34 Fed. Reg. 18827 (1969).
1" See generally Persistent Pesticides for a detailed, critical discussion of the
Mrak recommendations and their chances for success, in light of past federal
action.
" The most virulent and aggressive of these has been the Environmental Defense
Fund. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Finch, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir.
1970), in which the Secretary of HEW was ordered to consider a petition to set
"zero tolerance" levels for DDT and study scientific evidence and safe tolerance
levels in light of the FDCA, and Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the Secretary of Agriculture was given thirty days
to begin cancellation proceedings for DDT or show cause for refusal. Reasons
were filed and further argument was set for a later date. Final judgment came
January 7, 1971, when the court ordered the administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (added as a defendant when the FIFRA was removed from the
USDA) to issue immediate notices of cancellation of all uses of DDT and "to
determine whether evidence that DDT was an 'imminent hazard' to public health
required . . .the immediate suspension of all interstate shipments of DDT pend-
ing the outcome of lengthy concellation proceedings." Raleigh News and Ob-
server, Jan. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
"1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-65.1-.12 (1966).
'2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.5 (1966).
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improperly labeled, "adulterated" or "misbranded" product.23 The Com-
missioner of Agriculture can cancel any registration if the registrant has
tried to evade any of the provisions of the act2 4 and may enforce the act
by injunction,2 5 criminal action,26 "stop sale" orders, 27 or seizure of the
chemical. In addition, the Board of Agriculture can make any rules or
regulations relating to the sale and distribution of economic poisons that
it thinks necessary.29
Another regulatory control is the Structural Pest Control Law,80 which
covers all means of controlling termites and household pests and requires
commercial applicators to be licensed and pass an examination. Also of
possible applicability is the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which defines
food as adulterated "[i]f it... contains any poisonous... substance which
may render it injurious to health [or] . . . any added . . . substance
which may be unsafe.""1 Although the provisions do not explicitly mention
pesticides, they could be interpreted as pertinent. However, since the
Commissioner of Agriculture enforces both the FDCA and the IFRA,
the FDCA has never been used for pesticide control. An additional
statute invoked in the past in regard to pesticides is the North Carolina
"fish-kill" law,32 which allows the Board of Air and Water Resources
to investigate fish kills resulting from water pollution and to collect
damages in the name of the state. Finally, the Aerial Crop-Dusting Laws
"3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.3 (1966). Under the present statute, the best method
for limiting a use of a pesticide appears to be by application of the prohibition of
misbranding. The definition of "misbranded" includes any economic poison if the
labeling does not contain instructions adequate for the protection of the public, or
if the label does not have a warning needed to prevent injury to man or animals,
or if when used as directed, it is harmful to man, animals, or vegetation to which
it is applied. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.2 (1966).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.5(e) (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.4 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.7 (1966).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.10 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.11 (1966).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.6(c) (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 196-65.22-.35 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-129 (1966).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.3 (a) (7) (1966). Perhaps the most serious of
reported fish kills was the July, 1968 kill on the Cape Fear River, where more than
7000 pounds of fish were poisoned by endrin. Fortunately, the polluter was identi-
fiable, and eventually paid 15,800.89 dollars in damages. The pollution in this case
was caused by the polluter's own misuse and carelessness when he dumped leftover
endrin into a storm sewer. March Hearings at 61. Unhappily, the successful cases
are somewhat rare; more often it is impossible to determine the source of pollution.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-65.13-.22 (1966).
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licenses commercial applicators who use airplanes and regulates aerial
application of pesticides.
These -statutes are administered by responsible officials who willingly
receive and accept competent advice from the experts at our state uni-
versities. However, the statutes are more pertinent to informational
objectives and to protection of the consumer rather than to control of
the use of pesticides, and represent at best, a somewhat sketchy regulatory
structure. There is, for example, no existing statute to restrict the use of
pesticides. Once registered, a pesticide can be legally sold and used with-
out limitation, even for purposes for which registration would have been
refused. Another problem is that there are no statutory mandates for
persons who sell pesticides. It is estimated that seventy percent of the
farmers in North Carolina receive their information on proper application
of pesticides from dealers, 4 yet the dealers themselves are not compelled
to obtain any knowledge of the products they sell, and there is no means
of assuring that their advice is accurate. The commissioner has stated
that he has no way of knowing the volume of pesticides sold or currently
in use throughout the state.8 5 Surely this information would be valuable
for maintaining adequate control over distribution of pesticides, for pre-
venting abuses and for providing much needed data for research. Fur-
thermore, misuse of pesticides-in application and in careless disposal of
unused and contaminated materials-is regarded as a major source of
problems with pesticides,3 6 but there are no statutes respecting disposal
nor is there any control over some of the major groups of applicators.
Finally, although the misbranding section of the IFRA seems to contain
adequate authority for cancelling uses of pesticides," more explicit power
to cancel or ban is desirable.38
April Hearings at 42.
zne 4 Hearings app. A, at 5.
See generally, March Hearings apps. B, I; April Hearings at 49 & app. K.
Mr. Jacob Koomen, Director of the State Board of Health cited several trends in
rural pesticide use based upon a survey of 250 farms in one*North Carolina county:
a) most pesticides are applied by farmers rather than custom applicators; b) ex-
cessive noncompliance is evident regarding appropriate disposal of unused pesticides
and their containers; c) pesticides are often stored hazardously; d) few farmers
wear protective equipment when applying pesticides; and e) rural water supplies
are often inadequate to protect against pesticide contamination. March Hearings
app. I, at 3.
,Many conservation groups, however, do not believe that the only damage done
to the environment by pesticides is a result of misuse. See, e.g., March Hearings
at 61-62.
N.C. Gimr. STAT. § 106-65.7 (1966).On December 22, 1969, the Commissioner of Agriculture declared that in
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEW LEGISLATION
North Carolina has not been unaffected by the wide controversy over
pesticides. In response to the many questions raised over the proper
manner to control the use of pesticides, the 1969 North Carolina General
Assembly requested the Legislative Research Commission "to study agri-
cultural and other pesticides" and report its findings to the 1971 general
assembly." These duties were delegated to a subcommittee which held
hearings for several months,4" collected volumes of data and prepared a
thoughtful and well-researched report containing its recommendations for
new legislation.4
1
The Legislative Research Commission proposed new legislation affect-
ing organization, regulation, monitoring and research, and financing.
In the area of organization, the commission advised the creation of a new
five-member pesticide board composed of one representative each from
the Departments of Agriculture and Health and a conservation agency
and two citizens-at-large. 42 Administration and enforcement of the pro-
gram will remain within the Department of Agriculture. A further pro-
posal would establish an eleven member advisory committee of specified
composition to consult and advise the board and the commissioner on
technical matters.'
1970 the department would not register DDT for any of the uses cancelled by the
USDA (see note 18 sapra) and furthermore, would not register for use on tobacco
any labels containing DDD (TDE), aldrin, dieldrin, heptachlor, chlordane, or
lindane. For a copy of this order, see Judy Hearings app. C. The Attorney General
advised that the IFRA misbranding section was applicable, but the commissioner
stated that he would prefer more specific authorization. Judy Hearings app. A,
at 2.
"House Resolution 1392, 1969 N.C. Gen. Ass'y.
"See note 8 supra.
"REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION CONCERNING PESTICIDES
TO THE 1971 GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.C. PESTICIDES
REPORT].
" The commission made its recommendation of a separate agency on the theory
that broad representation would inspire public confidence. N.C. PESTICIDES RE-
PORT at 28.
,' The committee, to be appointed by the board, would be composed of three
members of the North Carolina State University School of Agriculture and Life
Sciences, one farmer, one member each representing the Departments of Agri-
culture and Health, a natural resources agency, agri-business, the pesticide in-
dustry, a conservationist and an ecologist. Id. These organizational recom-
mendations are largely the work of the Agricultural Chemicals Advisory Commit-
tee of the School of Agriculture and Life Sciences (SALS) at North Carolina
State University. Recommendations to the Pesticide Study Committee of the
Legislative Research Commission from SALS, May 22, 1970, at 3.
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The first segment of regulatory proposals permitting the board to
construct a pesticide management and control program, include pro-
visions: a) prohibiting the use of pesticides or disposal of containers
contrary to label instructions approved by the board, b) placing the burden
of proof to justify safety of pesticides on the applicant for registra-
tion, c) encouraging the board to delay dates of any use restrictions to
allow for phasing out of inventories, and d) authorizing the board to
adopt a list of restricted use pesticides with attendant regulations con-
cerning use and sale, other regulations to protect against misapplication,
drift and related problems, and regulations to insure proper disposal of
unused pesticides, containers, and other contaminated materials."'
A major question asked of all witnesses at the hearing was whether
or not DDT or other persistent pesticides should be legislatively banned.
Farmers and other agricultural interest groups were generally opposed
to any absolute prohibition. 5 Witnesses from conservation and wildlife
groups were equally adamant that DDT and some other pesticides be
legislatively banned.4" The commission seems to have reached a com-
promise.
The proffered regulations do provide sufficient authority to adequately
restrict dangerous pesticides, including the power to impose an absolute
ban.48 The benefit from this approach is the built-in flexibility allowing
the board to adjust to current needs. However, there is no assurance
that the board will take action to promulgate and enforce sufficient
restrictions or that political pressures and powerful lobbies will not delay
"N.C. PEsTIcI)Es REPORT at 31.
' See, e.g., Apri Hearings at 27 & app. D.
' See, e.g., April Hearings at 71; app. N, at 4; app. 0.
'7 This compromise was endorsed by several scientists. Dr. Dan Okun, a mem-
ber of the Mrak Commission and head of the Department of Environmental Sciences
at UNC-CH, who advocated restricting DDT to uses essential to health or welfare,
stated "[a]dministratively, it would be simple to ban the persistent pesticides, but
this would deny us their uses when... justified .... An investment in regulation
and control.., would permit a selective use of such pesticides where appropriate
with a minimum of associated hazards and a maximum benefit to the population."
March Hearings app. E, at 1. See also Recommendations to the Pesticide Study
Committee of the Legislative Research Commission from SALS, May 22, 1970,
at 2.
,' Many states have used regulatory powers to ban or partially ban uses of
pesticides, particularly DDT. See E. Bricklemyer & M. Heath, A Detailed Re-
view of State Pesticide Regulation and Programs 2, 4, 10, 18, 20, 22 (1970) (un-
published paper on file at Institute of Government, Chapel Hill, N.C.) and
Current Problems-Water Pollution Control in Texas, Part IV, Pesticide Pollution,
48 TEx. L. REv. 1130, 1135 nn.38 & 39 (1970).
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or prevent necessary protection. These and many other misgivings have
led at least one state to initiate specific legislative guidelines."9
The second major group of regulatory recommendations presents a
network of licensing laws for pesticide dealers and applicators and those
who commercially give advice concerning pesticides. This package would
require licensing of dealers selling pesticides on the restricted list and
registration of their employees. 5' It would provide for reporting of ship-
ments made and volumes sold by manufacturers and would contain in-
cidental provisions regarding record keeping, inspection and other matters
needed for an effective regulatory system.52 All types of commercial
applicators and consultants-including those already covered by current
law-would be licensed, but the recommendations would exempt farmers
who apply pesticides to their own land.53 Since farmers are the major
users of pesticides, their omission from this licensing system might sug-
gest a weak spot in the program. However, even if licensing of farmers
were incorporated into the laws, the administrative impossibility of
enforcing this provision would make the measure meaningless.54
Another chink in this legislative armor is that the licensing itself is
insufficient to ensure that dealers are properly educated in pesticide use.
Thus, the commission has submitted proposals in the field of education,
research and staffing. It suggests that funds be allocated for expanded
education and training for dealers, applicators, their employees, and
,' The 1969 California legislature enacted statutes that require the Department
of Agriculture to develop a program for the review of all registered economic
poisons that endanger the environment, to establish criteria for the department's
refusal to register or cancel a pesticide. The statutes also provide for designated
reports to be rendered both by dealers and by the Director of Agriculture. E.
Bricklemyer & M. Heath, A Detailed Review of State Pesticide Regulation and
Programs 7 (1970).
A question arises in regard to whether North Carolina's regulatory proposals
should have included legislative guidelines of this nature. This writer believes,
however, that the new system should be enacted as recommended, with a watchful
eye kept on the new board's activities. Guidelines should be established only when
the need presents itself.
Several states have proposed absolute legislative bans on pesticides, but they
have always been defeated. See, e.g., id. at 14, 26, 41.




' The expenses of additional staff necessary to license farmers would in itself
be prohibitive and the impracticalities of systematically monitoring the program
cannot be overcome at this time. Interview with Mr. Milton Heath, Assistant
Director, Institute of Government, in Chapel Hill, N.C., on Dec. 19, 1970.
19711
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
farmers. 5 North Carolina State University has requested appropriations
to implement this educational program, and it is hoped that these requests
will be given serious consideration."' The commission believes that
enlarged research and monitoring programs are highly desirable, and thus
recommends that the state's service monitoring activities be consolidated
and that research be a function of institutions of higher learning.57 It is
essential that current research programs be continued and expanded, for
the development of effective, safe and nondangerous pest control methods
will be the ultimate factor in halting pesticide pollution.18 Since the new
controls will be only as effective as their implementation and enforcement,
the commission further advised additional staffing to meet the needs of
the new program. 9 The measures to finance these proposals call for a
combination of fees raised by licensing and appropriations from the gen-
eral fund totaling 400,000 dollars for the coming biennium.60
It is difficult to postulate the effect of the commission's recommenda-
tions on the pesticide problem in North Carolina. The suggestions have
yet to be reduced to statutory form, and the statutes, when drafted, as well
as the budget requests, must be approved by the 1971 general assembly.
Enacted as proposed, such a comprehensive regulatory scheme will repre-
sent a step forward for the state in pesticide regulation and control. But
is the step large enough? Whether the regulatory structure will be as
effective at preventing harmful use of persistent pesticides as a legislative
prohibition will depend largely on what regulations are made by the
proposed board and how these rulings are enforced by the Department of
N.C. PESTrcims REPORT at 37.
The Agricultural Extension Service, an arm of the USDA, has been attempting
to develop a total education program in cooperation with North Carolina State
University with pesticide co-ordinators in each county. The present need is for a
dealer education program. March Hearings at 42-46.
r N.C. PESTICIDES REPORT at 37. SALS has a very active research program
sponsoring some thirty programs with funds of 727,000 dollars. March Hearings
3-4. A segment of SALS recently has devoted much effort to the development of
a pesticides monitoring system. See WATER RESOURCES RESEARCHr INSTITUTE OF
UNC, A WATER MONITORING SYSTEM FOR PESTICIDES IN NORTH CAROLINA (Jan-
uary, 1970).
" Dr. C.J. Nusbaum of SALS reports a vast arsenal of pest control methods
available for use including population reduction by cultural practices, crop rotation,
seed selection and treatment, development of resistant varieties and biological agents.
March Hearings app. D, at 4. Dr. Nusbaum also remarked that scientists are now
thinking in terms of "integrated control programs where combinations of treat-
ments will be used rather than reliance upon a single treatment." Id. at 11.
I N.C. PESTICIDES RZEPORT at 38. For the Commissioner of Agriculture's estima-
tion of minimum personnel needs, see July Hearings app. A, at 5.
" N.C. PESTICIDES REPORT at 39.
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Agriculture. The great gaps in current education programs need to be
filled by increased funding if the licensing proposals are to be meaningful.
The issue of persistent pesticides is not whether the chemical revolu-
tion in the control of pests has proven useful .... [Ojur miracle in-
novations must be made to serve the ends of civilization .... Certainly
no goal surpasses in importance the need to prevent man from harming,
abusing or destroying himself and his environment. 61
ELIZABETH LYNNE Pou
Federal Estate Taxation-Life Isurance Trusts
Life insurance is often purchased by a wife on the life of her husband
for the benefit of herself or her children. Should the wife predecease her
insured husband, she may provide that he act either as executor of her estate
or as trustee of a testamentary trust containing the insurance policies on his
life and her other investment assets. Upon the insured husband's sub-
sequent death, the Commissioner may contend that the proceeds of the
insurance policies are to be included in the husband's gross estate due to
the fact that at the time of his death the husband possessed incidents of
ownership in the insurance policies, albeit in only a fiduciary capacity.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt with such a problem in
Fruehauf v. Commissioner," in which fiduciary powers held by the insured
over life insurance policies were deemed sufficient "incidents of owner-
ship" to compel inclusion in the insured's gross estate under section 2042
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,2 although he had neither owned
nor made an inter vivos transfer of the policies.
Vera Fruehauf purchased six life insurance policies on the life of her
husband, Harry, designated herself sole beneficiary of each policy, and
paid all premiums due prior to her death. Under Vera's will, Harry was
named both coexecutor of her estate and cotrustee of a trust to be formed
" Persistent Pesticides at 611.
1427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
'INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 2042, provides in part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(2) RECEIVA3LE BY OTHER BxEN CARIES----To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any
of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with
any other person.
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from her residuary estate. The will provided that "[t] o the extent possible,
all life insurance policies owned by me on the life of others .. .shall be
assigned to the. . . trust."' The net income of the trust was to be paid
to Harry for life with remainder to Vera's issue per stirpes.
The executors and trustees were given broad powers under Vera's
will,4 including the right to surrender the insurance policies for their cash
surrender value. Harry died approximately fourteen months after Vera,
leaving the administration of Vera's estate incomplete. Consequently, there
had been no distribution to the trust provided for in Vera's will, nor
had Harry been appointed trustee by the probate court. Therefore, the
assets of Vera's estate, including the insurance policies, were distributed
outright to the Fruehauf's sole surviving son pursuant to Vera's will.
The executors of Harry's estate did not include the proceeds of the
insurance policies in his gross estate when they filed his federal estate tax
return. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency on the theory that since
Harry, at the time of his death, possessed "incidents of ownership" in the
policies as cotrustee and as coexecutor of Vera's estate, the proceeds of
the policies should be included in his gross estate under section 2042. The
Commissioner did not attempt to include in Harry's gross estate any of
the other assets that were to comprise the corpus of the testamentary trust.
Section 2042 includes in the gross estate the proceeds of all life in-
surance policies on a decedent's life to the extent that "the decedent pos-
sessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either
alone or in conjunction with any other person."5 Subject to one excep-
tion,' the Code offers no definition of the term "incidents of ownership."
The Regulations, however, provide some guidance:
'Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915, 917 (1968).
'Vera's will provided in part:
Tenth: My Executors and my trustees may retain for such periods as they
determine advisable any insurance policies owned by me at my death on the
life of any other person, and pay the premiums on such policies whenever
they become due out of income and/or principal as they shall see fit, and
cause themselves to be designated as the beneficiaries thereof, or they may,
at any time, sell and assign any of such policies to the person whose life is
insured for the cash surrender value thereof, or they may surrender any of
such policies for their cash surrender value, or they may, at any time, convert
any of such policies into paid up policies in whatever amounts may be pro-
vided by the terms of such policies. With respect to any policies retained
by them, they may arrange for the automatic application of dividends in
reduction of premium payments and they may borrow on any of such policies,
make premium payments from the funds so derived, and repay such loans.
427 F.2d at 82.
'INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2042.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042, does provide that "the term 'incidents of
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For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of owner-
ship" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the
technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to
the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the
policy. Thus it includes the power to change the beneficiary, to sur-
render or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assign-
ment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a
loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc. .... 7
Harry's estate argued that the power Harry possessed over the policies
did not constitute "incidents of ownership" within the meaning of section
2042 since these powers were held solely in a fiduciary capacity, and Harry
at no time had owned or transferred the policies in an individual capacity.
The Commissioner felt that both of these contentions were incorrect, and
"[t]he issue was thus narrowed ... to the question of whether the pow-
ers over the policies which decedent . . . held constitute 'incidents of
ownership' in view of the fact that he held these powers in a fiduciary
capacity only."' Both the Tax Court and the court of appeals answered
in the affirmative, but for different reasons.
The Tax Court majority, relying heavily on cases arising under section
20381 (revocable transfers), reasoned that
[t]here is no doubt at all but that sections 2038 and 2042 are parts
of a tax pattern to make includable in the gross estate property over
which the decedent held various powers affecting beneficial enjoyment.
Since case law makes immaterial for purposes of section 2038 the
capacity in which the powers are held, it is not logical to make
capacity a significant factor as far as section 2042 is concerned.' 0
ownership' includes a reversionary interest ... if the value of such reversionary
interest exceeded 5 per cent of the value of the policy immediately before the death
of the decedent."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958).
8427 F.2d at 83.
'INT. RXV. CODE of 1954, § 2038, provides in part:
(a) ... The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty-
(1) . . . To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the
enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change
through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the
decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person
(without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such
power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is
relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death.
"0 Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915, 926 (1968).
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The Tax Court held that "the fact the powers over the policies were held
in a fiduciary capacity is no bar to their constituting incidents of owner-
ship under section 2042."" The concurring judges, however, intimated
that they would not go so far as to hold that "any power in the nature
of an incident of ownership exercisable by an insured decedent in his
fiduciary capacity causes the proceeds of the policy to be included in his
gross estate."'- They felt that the holding should be limited to its facts.
That is, Harry's power as trustee enabled him to surrender the policies for
their cash surrender value, which could be added to the trust corpus, there-
by increasing the income producing capacity of the trust to Harry's
advantage as income beneficiary.
The court of appeals disagreed with the Tax Court's approach in two
respects: (1) the Tax Court's failure to recognize the different considera-
tions underlying sections 2038 and 2042; and (2) its failure to recognize
the fundamental nature of the fiduciary relationship. In discussing the
first point the court of appeals declared:
We must disagree with the Tax Court's broad per se rule. We
believe there is a distinction between the issues arising under § 2038
where the decedent, as transferor of certain property, possesses at his
death the power, even though in a fiduciary capacity, to revoke or
change the transfer, and the issues in a case arising under § 2042 where
the decedent is the transferee, in a fiduciary capacity, of powers con-
stituting incidents of ownership in the insurance policies on his life.
Where a decedent holds the requisite powers over policies on his life
solely because he is a transferee, in a fiduciary capacity, of those powers,
with no beneficial interest therein, such arrangement can hardly be
construed as a substitute for testamentary disposition on decedent's
part.13
As to the second point, the court criticized the Tax Court for not following
previous Tax Court decisions. In Estate of Newcomb Carlton,"4 in which
the decedent transferred twenty-one insurance policies along with certain
securities to a trust, the Tax Court had held that the decedent's powers
over insurance policies did not constitute incidents of ownership. Al-
though the decedent retained the right to appoint a cotrustee (including
himself), as well as the right to the trust income in excess of the amount
needed to pay the premiums on the policies, the Tax Court concluded that
111d.
12 Id.
" 427 F.2d at 84 (emphasis added).1'34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
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[a]ny control that decedent would have acquired over the insurance
policies -had he appointed himself cotrustee would have been control
over the policies jointly with the corporate trustee as trustee only and
such control would be solely for the benefit of the trust. Such control
as trustee would not constitute incidents of ownership in the insurance
policies in decedent -except in his capacity as trustee for the benefit of
the trust.'5
Similarly, the Tax Court clearly recognized the principle that fiduciary
powers do not necessarily constitute incidents of ownership within the
meaning of section 2042 in Estate of Bert L. Fuchs:6
Assuming, arguendo, that the insured... possessed the naked power
to change beneficiaries or make an assignment, we cannot say ... that
the insured herein should be treated in any way differently than a com-
mon trustee. Each insured herein was under no less of a legal duty to
respect the terms of the partners' agreement than a common trustee
legally obligated to respect the terms of a trust indenture. Decedent
merely had the same type of power over the ... policies as a trustee's
power to affect trust proceeds. We do not believe that this type of
naked power alone is sufficient to bring the insurance proceeds within
decedent's gross estate.17
Based upon these two decisions, the court of appeals rejected the
sweeping rule espoused by the Tax Court in Fruehauf by refusing to hold
that "mere possession by a decedent of any powers in the nature of incidents
of ownership in a fiduciary capacity invariably requires the inclusion of
the proceeds of the policies on the decedent's life in his gross estate."' 8
Nevertheless, the court felt that since Harry could exercise his fiduciary
powers in such a manner as to benefit himself as the income beneficiary of
Vera's trust, these powers, notwithstanding the fiduciary capacity in which
they were held, did constitute sufficient "incidents of ownership" within
the meaning of section 2042?'
1 Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
1047 T.C. 199 (1966). This case involved a partnership purchase agreement that
prohibited decedent-owner from exercising his rights under the life insurance policy
to change the beneficiary or to surrender the policy for its cash surrender value.
1 Id. at 204.
18427 F.2d at 85.
"
0Whereas the concurring judges in the Tax Court only emphasized Harry's
power as cotrustee of Vera's testamentary trust, the court of appeals felt that
either power alone (i.e., cotrustee or coexecutor) would be sufficient to demand in-
clusion, reasoning that
[u]nder the provisions of ... decedent's wife's will, decedent was au-
thorized, both as executor and as trustee, to surrender the policies on his life
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One may criticize the Fruehauf opinion for its failure to examine the
position of life insurance in the overall estate tax scheme. Since Fruehauf
is the first case to hold that a decedent possesses "incidents of ownership"
by virtue of his fiduciary power in life insurance policies, which he neither
owned nor transferred inter vivos, one might well expect the court to set
forth a detailed analysis of its reasoning. However, the court not only
failed to set forth the rationale of its holding, but it also failed to take
proper account of Estate of Newcomb Carlton,20 which held for the tax-
payer on the precise issue raised in Fruehauf. Although Fruehauf
arguably overrules Carlton while purporting to rely upon it, it is actually
a stronger case for the taxpayer than Carlton since the decedent in Carlton
at one time owned the policies outright and subsequently made an inter
vivos transfer to a trust, reserving the right to the net income in excess
of that needed to pay the premiums and the right to appoint himself as
cotrustee. Had he exercised his right to appoint himself trustee he, like
Harry, could have surrendered the policies for their cash surrender value,
thereby increasing the income producing ability of the trust which would
inure to his benefit in exactly the same manner that prompted the court
in Fruehauf to hold against the taxpayer. Moreover, in Fruehauf the
fiduciary powers that the decedent possessed were not retained by him in
connection with a lifetime transfer, as was the case in Carlton, but rather
were conferred upon him by his wife's will.
Although the court sharply criticized the Tax Court for not dis-
tinguishing the basic nature of the fiduciary relationship, it apparently
felt that if the trustee had a personal stake in the trust (e.g., as income
beneficiary) then this somehow changed the "fundamental nature of the
fiduciary duty." No support for this position can be found in the Code or
case law. In fact, Carlton stands in stark conflict with this view. Arguably,
it should be of no significance whether or not the fiduciary has a personal
stake in the trust. For one thing, he is still subject to control by a state
court for abuse of discretion. This position was apparently adopted in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. United States," in which the first circuit seemingly
for their cash value. If this had been done the policies would have been
transformed from non-income producing assets designed to benefit primarily
the ultimate beneficiary of the trust into income producing assets (since
it must be assumed that such proceeds would not remain idle), which would
benefit decedent when he assumed his capacity as trustee and income
beneficiary of the trust.
Id. at 86.
2034 T.C. 988 (1960).
21423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
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rejected its earlier holding in State Street Trust Co. v. United States,22
and implied that since even broad fiduciary powers are within the reach
of equity courts, they do not constitute the requisite powers over the trust
property that demand inclusion in a decedent's gross estate.23
A major deficiency in the court's opinion is its failure to deal with
the estate's argument that under the Commissioner's view, insurance is
treated more harshly than other assets,24 thus being contrary to Congress'
express intent to treat life insurance like other property. 5 While the full
22263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). In State Street, a case arising under section
2036, the court accepted the Commissioner's strict view that certain broad fiduciary
powers can constitute a power to shift beneficiary enjoyment of a trust interest
between life tenants and remaindermen and that these powers may be beyond the
reach of a court of equity. However, it must be pointed out that in this case the
fiduciary powers were retained by, not conferred upon, the decedent.
"2 Even before Old Colony Trust state courts had generally agreed with a
Massachusetts court's criticism of State Street in a case holding that a trustee's
broad power to shift enjoyment is subject to control by a court of equity, and
such power, regardless of how broad, can only be exercised in accordance with
proper fiduciary standards. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Stone, 348 Mass.
345, 203 N.E.2d 547 (1965). The court considered State Street and said that
"[e]ven broadly expressed administrative and management powers... 'are limited by
standards which the Massachusetts court of equity could and would apply to supervise
effectively * * * [proper trust] administration.' We disagree with any suggestion
to the contrary ... in the majority opinion in that case.... ." Id. at 351 n.8, 203
N.E.2d at 552 n.8. See also, United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir.
1962); Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968); Estate of Marvin L. Pardee,
49 T.C. 140 (1967). Even the Commissioner, prior to Fruehauf, seemed to be
backing away from his strict position regarding fiduciary powers. Cf. Rev. Rul.
69-56, 1969-1 Cumt. BULL. 224.
The estate's brief stated:
Thus in 1954 Congress took great care to be sure that the same re-
versionary interest rule that applies to transfers made by a decedent that
take effect at his death (section 2037) applied also to insurance so as "[t]o
place life insurance policies in an analogous position to other property **
This illustrates the degree of thought that Congress gave to a redefinition of
"incidents of ownership" in 1954; yet it did nothing to indicate that it in-
tended to create a broader rule for the inclusion of life insurance proceeds
than for other assets. Nevertheless, that is precisely the result that the
Tax Court reached in this case, for its holding includes the life insurance
proceeds in Harry's estate but not the other assets in the saine trust!
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 19-20.
25 Congress' reasons for the 1954 changes in the taxation of life insurance is
set forth in the following Senate Report:
The proceeds of life insurance on a decedent are subjected to tax in his
estate under present law if the policy is payable to the executor, if the
decedent paid the premiums on the policy (in this case includable in pro-
portion to the amount paid), or if the decedent possessed any elements of
ownership in the policy at date of death.
No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent initially
purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to the
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extent of congressional intent in this respect remains uncertain, the
estate's argument should have been answered rather than completely
ignored. At first glance it does seem unfair to include the total amount
of the insurance proceeds in Harry's gross estate since he neither owned
the policies outright nor had he transferred them during his life. In fact,
Harry did not enjoy any of the tangible benefits of ownership during his
lifetime other than the right, derived solely from Vera's will, to become
income beneficiary of a trust comprised partially of the insurance policies as
well as other assets. The fact that none of the other assets that were to be
included in Vera's testamentary trust were included in Harry's gross estate,
although his fiduciary powers over these noninsurance assets were just as
broad as those over the insurance policies, does show that life insurance,
for the first time since the 1954 Code, is being treated more harshly than
other assets.
The obvious discrimination that one discerns in Fruehauf can be
further illustrated by two hypotheticals: First, if Harry in his capacity as
coexecutor immediately surrendered the policies for their cash surrender
value, no inclusion would result because at his death he would not have
possessed any incidents of ownership in the policies, but only incidents of
ownership as cotrustee in noninsurance assets. However, since the prop-
erty existed in the form of life insurance at the time of his death, inclusion
was required. Second, suppose that instead of life insurance, the asset
had been nonincome producing real property, and Harry had the power
to sell and reinvest in some type of income producing asset. Here, even
though the exercise of this power would benefit him as income beneficiary,
there would be no inclusion 6 because the power that Harry possessed
property and to discriminate against life insurance in this respect is not
justified.
The House and your committee's bill retains the present rule including
life-insurance proceeds in the decedent's estate if the policy is owned by him
or payable to his executor, but the premium test has been removed. To place
life-insurance policies in an analogous position to other property, however,
it is necessary to make the 5-percent reversionary interest rule, applicable
to other property, also applicable to life insurance.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., found in 3 U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News 4757 (1954).
"8 Since the fiduciary powers Harry held over Vera's testamentary trust
were conferred rather than retained, no other type of asset would be included
in Harry's gross estate under any of the gross estate sections for the simple
reason that the estate tax is a transfer tax which requires a transfer before
taxation is appropriate. C. LOwNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GiFt TAXES § 1.1 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as LOWNDES & KRAMER].
The estate tax extends to those transactions in which the decedent previously
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would not be retained by him in connection with a lifetime transfer, but
rather would be considered as conferred upon him by Vera's will. Al-
though the authorities differ as to whether life insurance should be treated
on a par with other types of property,2r Congress has indicated that it
should be so treated. As such, the dictum in Gorman v. United States"s
becomes particularly instructive: since Congress intended life insurance
to be treated like other property a "court [should] not legislate, nor shall
the Service, in an area specifically reserved to Congress."29
Fruehauf portrays only one of the many estate tax pitfalls awaiting
the unwary estate planner faced with life insurance. Primarily, these
problems arise because at no time during the history of the estate tax has
Congress, the Treasury, or the courts set forth a workable definition of
"incidents of ownershp." Congress should meet this challenge and care-
fully define the scope of "incidents of ownership" as well as the position
of life insurance in the overall scheme of estate taxation.30 Until this can
be done, however, estate planners should avoid placing the surviving spouse
owned and transferred property during his lifetime but retained some interest,
power, or right over the property. The estate taxation of such transactions
is justified on the basis that they are mere substitutes for testamentary dispositions
of property. The sole exception to these general statements is the specific section
of the Code that deals with the situation in which a decedent possessed powers
that were conferred upon him by another person-section 2041. Arguably, this
section is not applicable to the Frimhauf facts. Section 2041 taxes general powers
of appointment and thus permits inclusion in the gross estate of property never
owned nor transferred by the decedent. In effect, this section represents con-
gressional recogniton of general powers of appointment as substantial incidents of
ownership since the holder of the power can freely dispose of property that he does
not own according to his own desires. Since the language of section 2042 seems, on
its face, to be more analogous to the language of section 2041 dealing with conferred
powers (i.e., section 2042 does not expressly require that the decedent own or
transfer the policy, but only that he possess at his death any of the incidents of
ownership), the Commissioner has interpreted section 2042 literally, and has taken
the position that if the decedent dies with any of the requisite incidents of owner-
ship over the policies, then the entire face value is to be included in his gross estate
regardless of whether he possessed these incidents of ownership as a "string"
retained by him as a result of an incomplete transfer, or simply as a result of
having them conferred upon him in a fiduciary capacity.
"' Many writers disagree with Congress' position that life insurance should be
treated like any other type property. E.g., LOwNDES & KRAmER § 13.4; Groll,
Some Federal Tax Aspects of Life Insurance, 15 DE PAUL L. RFv. 48 (1965).
However, Congress' position has been supported by others. E.g., Swihart, Federal
Taxation of Life Insurance Wealth, 37 IND. L.J. 167 (1962).
" 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
Id. at 230.
80This has been suggested previously in Note, Taxation-Federal Estate Tax-
Cotriesteeship Sufficient Incidents of Ownership To Require Inclusion of Corpus in
Cotrustee's Gross Estate Where Possibility of Economic Benefit Exists, 22 Vmanm.
L. REv. 711 (1969).
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in a position whereby he has any powers over insurance polices on his
life capable of being exercised for his own benefit. Thus, in order to avoid
the Fruehauf tax trap the estate planner must provide for two trusts-
one containing only the insurance policies, over which the surviving
spouse should have no powers in the nature of "incidents of ownership ;,,"1
the other containing noninsurance assets, over which the surviving spouse
may safely act as trustee. Additionally, Fruehauf indicates that should the
surviving spouse act as executor, he must be expressly prohibited from
exercising any powers in the nature of "incidents of ownership" over in-
surance policies on his life owned by his spouse, if these policies are to
ultimately become a part of a Fruehauf trust. Until this area is resolved,
this is the only safe course of estate planning to take when faced with
life insurance trusts.
TH oMAs R. CRAWFORD
Federal Estate Taxation-Revenue Ruling 67-463 Has Been Dealt
A Grave Injustice
As the smoke clears from the aftermath of the decision of First Na-
tional Bank (of Midland) v. United States,1 we find that the Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service has once again met defeat. The score now
stands: taxpayers, three, the Commissioner and Revenue Ruling 67-463,
zero.' Completely realizing the possible adverse consequences to taxpayers
and estate tax planners, it will be shown, nevertheless, that the Commis-
sioner has been dealt a grave injustice.
Several years ago the Commissioner decided to review the estate tax
consequences of gifts of life insurance in situations where the deceased-
insured paid part of the premiums in contemplation of death, but had given
away all incidents of ownership in the policy more than three years prior
to death.3 To determine the amount to be included in the decedent's
gross estate the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling 67-463:
"
1In fact, the surviving spouse should never be designated as trustee over the
insurance trust since many states have provisions providing that a trustee has
certain broad powers, such as the power to sell, even though not specifically granted
by the trust instrument.
'423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
'Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 327.
'For example, decedent took out a fifty thousand dollar face amount policy on
his life six years before death. He paid all six thousand dollars of the premiums(one thousand dollars annually), with one-half (three thousand dollars) of the
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A decedent, within three years of death and in contemplation of
death, paid the premiums on a policy of insurance on his life. He had
transferred the incidents of ownership in the policy to his wife more
than three years prior to his death. Held, such payment was a transfer
of an interest in the policy measured by the proportion the amount of
premiums so paid bears to the amount of premiums paid. Accordingly,
the value of the proportionate part of the amount receivable as insurance
that is attributable to those premiums paid by the decedent within three
years of death is includable in his gross estate under section 2035 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This conclusion is also applicable
where the wife originally applied for the insurance.4
The Commissioner's first setback with regard to Revenue Ruling 67-
463 came in 1968 in Gorman v. United States,5 in which the life insurance
company issued a policy on the decedent's life that designated his wife as
beneficiary and owner of all rights and privileges.6 In procuring the
insurance, the insured had requested that the policy be so written. The
policy was issued, and the insured paid the first and, as it turned out, the
only premium. Less than one year later the decedent-insured died. The
district director of the Internal Revenue Service sought to- include the
proceeds of the policy in decedent's gross estate,7 arguing that the de-
cedent's procurement of the policy or his payment of the premiums
amounted to a gift in contemplation of death within the meaning of section
2035 of the Internal Revenue Code.8 Plaintiff, decedent's wife and
premiums being paid within three years of his death. When he took out the policy
initially, he immediately transferred all the incidents of ownership to the bene-
ficiaries. It is conceded that the last three premium payments were made in con-
templation of death.
' Rev. Rul. 67-463M. Under this revenue ruling, in the example set forth in note
3 supra, the inclusion would be twenty-five thousand dollars because one-half of
the premims were paid in contemplation, and one-half of the face amount equals
twenty-five thousand dollars. Under the ruling the same result would be reached
even if the beneficiaries or donees originally applied for the policy on the life of the
decedent.
288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
0 Id. at 236.
7 Id. at 234-35.
' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035, states:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation
of his death.
(b) APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE.-If the decedent within a period of 3
years ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) transferred an interest
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executrix under his will, paid the tax and sued for refund. The district
court held that the premium was paid in contemplation of death but that
the amount to be included in the decedent's gross estate was only the actual
cash premium paid and not the pro rata amount of the proceeds."
In December of 1968, the Commissoner temporarily found reason to
rejoice. In First National Bank (of Midland) v. United States,'° also a
refund suit, the United States District Court upheld Revenue Ruling 67-
463.11 In this case the decedent and his wife purchased two life insurance
policies on decedent's life, one for each of their daughters. The daughters
were named as the owners of the policy and held all the incidents of
ownership in their respective policies. The premium payments, including
three in contemplation of death,"2 were made with community property
funds. A portion of the proceeds of the two policies were included in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2035. The court did not discuss prior
case law or legislative history but merely cited Revenue Ruling 67-463 as
the basis for its decision.' 3 The Commissioner's apparent victory was
swept aside when the fifth circuit reversed the district court on March 23,
1970.1 The court of appeals relied on the Gorman case and Estate of
Coleman'5 discussed below.
The Tax Court was faced with this issue for the first time in 1969. A
full court review dealt the Commissioner another defeat. In Coleman the
decedent's three children purchased, as record owners and beneficiaries, an
insurance policy on the decedent's life. The decedent had paid all the
premiums, and it was admitted that several premiums were paid in con-
templation of death. The government contended that the amount to be
included in the gross estate was "that part of the total proceeds which bears
in property, relinquished a power, or exercised or released a general power of
appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release shall, unless shown
to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the
meaning of this section and sections 2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable transfers
and powers of appointment); but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or
release made before such 3-year period shall be treated as having been made in
contemplation of death.
The purpose of section 2035 is to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions
and thus prevent evasion of the estate tax.
'288 F. Supp. at 234.
" 69-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 12,574 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1968).
"Id. 12,574, at 84,831.
"Id. The plaintiffs made no effort to disavow the presumption that the premiums
were made in contemplation of death.
'a Id.
"423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
1052 T.C. 921 (1969).
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the same proportion to the total proceeds as the premiums paid in con-
templation of death bear to the total premiums paid."'-6 The court held
that the amount includable in the gross estate was limited to the premiums
paid in contemplation of death.'
Even though the Commissioner has lost three cases, he has not and
probably will not concede defeat at the moment because the opinions in the
three decided cases have been far from convincing and well-reasoned. In
Gorman the court began its attack on the Commissioner's position by re-
lating the legislative history of section 2042.8 The court reasoned that
the deletion of the "premium payment test" in section 2042 indicated a
congressional intent to prohibit any inclusion of policy proceeds in an
insured's estate based on the insured's payment of premiums.'" The court
decided that to allow the IRS to use a premium-based test to include part
of the proceeds of life insurance-even in valuing a transfer in contempla-
tion of death under section 2035-would effectively defeat the con-
gressional policy evidenced by the changes in section 2042." The court
felt that Revenue Ruling 67-463 was an administrative attempt to adopt
in part the premium payment test, which was deleted from the revenue laws
by the enactment of the 1954 Code.2 '
In so reasoning the court seems to have adopted an unnecessarily
broad interpretation of the 1954 changes. Congress rejected the "payment
of premiums" test as too harsh a basis for inclusion of insurance proceeds
in the taxable estate under section 2042 but gave no indication that it
intended to make payments of premiums irrelevant to taxation under other
sections of the federal estate tax.2 The majority of the House Ways and
Means Committee indicated that "payment of premiums is no longer a
factor in determining the tax liability under this section (section 2042)
of insurance proceeds."' Thus the court failed to distinguish between
"payment of premiums" as an independent basis for inclusion under
section 2042, a basis that had been deleted from the Code in 1954, and
the payment of a premium as a transfer made in contemplation of death
'1 Id. at 922. The government relied on Rev. Rul. 67-463.
17 Id. at 924.
1" 288 F. Supp. at 227-28. See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2042. This section deals
with the rules governing the includibility of proceeds of life insurance when the
insured retains "incidents of ownership."




2 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A316-17 (1954).
21Id. at A316 (emphasis added).
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under section 2035.24 It must be re-emphasized that in Gorman, as well
as in First National Bank (of Midland) and Coleman, the courts were
concerned only with a section 2035 inclusion and not with a section 2042.2"
The next problem in the Gorman decision concerns the court's view
as to what constitutes a "transfer" under section 2035.28 The court stated
that
[t]he specific interpretative issue is what is the value of the property
transferred by the decedent . . .when he pays in contemplation of
death directly or indirectly premiums on a life insurance policy.27
The court decided that once it has been determined that an interest in
property has been transferred in contemplation of death, the amount in-
cluded in decedent's gross estate is the value of the interest transferred as
of the applicable valuation date.2" The court stated that "our focus must
at all times be directed to what was in fact transferred by the decedent
when he paid a premium in contemplation of death." 29 The court then
relied on the "specific asset theory"30 and decided that if anything were
to be included in the gross estate, "it should be limited to the value of
the asset transferred, namely the premium." 3' 1 Thus the court in Gorman
failed to come to grips with the issue to what constitutes a "transfer."
The government asserted that the procurement of the insurance policy
by the decedent for his wife was a "transfer" of the policy within the
meaning of section 203512 and that the total proceeds from the policy, as
a result of payment of the premium, is includable in the estate of the
decedent. The government cites Chase National Bank v. United States3
",The government argued that the conclusion reached by the ruling is actually
consistent with the intent of Congress in dropping the premium payment test from
the code because it places life insurance on an equal footing with other property.
" See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042; Treas. Reg. § 20-2042 (1954).
2 288 F. Supp. at 228.27Id.28Id. See Treas. Reg. § 20-2035-1(e), T.D. 6501.
2 288 F. Supp. at 230-31. The court's discussion fails to shed light on the prob-
lem.
30 Id. at 233.
81.1d.
12 Id. at 226.
--278 U.S. 327 (1929). The decedent purchased three policies payable to his
wife as beneficiary. He reserved the right to change the beneficiary and to sur-
render the policies. After his death, his executor contended that there was no
transfer because the proceeds did not come directly from the decedent but instead
came from the insurer. The Supreme Court refused to accept this distinction and
reasoned that because of his retained rights, the decedent until his death retained
a legal interest in the policy, which effectively gave him a power of disposition
over the proceeds. The Court concluded that the termination of such power was
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in support of its view. The government contended that even though
ownership in the policy was created in the wife, the transaction itself was
really a transfer by the decedent of those rights since he was the one who
provided the consideration or motivating force for the transaction. The
insured was the master of his offer and the transferor of the policy when
he made application to the insurance company and decided to have the
company's "bargained for promise" run to his wife." This position is
appealing since the law should not distinguish between the situation where
A pays B to give something to C and the situation where A purchases
the thing and makes a gift of it to C. 5 The court in Gorman, however,
dismissed the argument by noting that the Supreme Court in Chase never
considered the relationship of premiums to proceeds. 6 In so doing, the
court simply avoided the fact that the procurement of the policy itself
may have been a transfer in contemplation of death. Inclusion of a gift
under section 2035 should not be affected by the fact that, at the time
of the transfer, the decedent immediately and absolutely parted with the
enjoyment of or title to the property.3  As stated in United States v.
W/ells: 8
a constitutionally taxable transfer and need not have been preceded directly by a
transfer from the decedent to the recipient of his bounty. It thought the word
"transfer" should not be restricted to direct transfers, but should "at least include
the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with pur-
pose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another." Id. at 337.
" See Simmons, District Court invalidates IRS' three-year premium payment
rule, 29 J. TAX. 338, 339 (1968).
" See generally Note, Inclusion of Insurance Proceeds Because of the Decedent's
Continuous Premium Paynent-The Continued Validity of Revenue Ruling 67-463,
64 Nw. U.L. REv. 116 (1969). Under section 2035 if A transfers one hundred
dollars in cash to B in contemplation of death only one hundred dollars will be in-
cluded in A's gross estate. However, if A transfers a piece of real property in
contemplation with a fair market value of one hundred dollars, and when A dies
the property has a fair market value (FMV) of one thousand dollars, one
thousand dollars is included in A's gross estate. What if A, in contemplation of
death, gives X one hundred dollars and tells him to buy a certain piece of real
property and give it to B. If this piece of property has FMV of one thousand
dollars when A dies, surely no one would doubt that the amount to be included
should be one thousand dollars. This same type of analysis should be applied in the
life insurance situation being discussed. See 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 327, 328, which
states that:
[A] premium payment under a contract of life insurance by other than the
owner of the policy is analogous to a gift of specific property by the donor to
the owner. Unlike the unrestricted gift of money a premium payment is a gift
of insurance protection, a transfer of an interest in the policy which is trans-
muted at death into the proceeds of the policy.
288 F. Supp. at 228.
'
T Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(a), T.D. 6501.
"283 U.S. 102 (1931).
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[t]he quality which brings the transfer within the statute is indicated
by the context and manifest purpose. Transfers in contemplation of
death are included within the same category... with transfers intended
to take effect at or after the death of the transferor. The dominant pur-
pose is to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus to
prevent evasion of the estate tax.s 9
Thus, the Chase notion is that the decedent need not transmit property
directly to the recipient to be viewed as the "transferor" within the mean-
ing of section 2035. The actions of the insured in Gorman could well be
viewed as equivalent to a "transfer" of the policy. Certainly, the transaction
in Gorman is not functionally distinguishable from a situation where the
policy was originally issued in the decedent's own name and then trans-
ferred to the wife immediately. ° It should be remembered that while the
insurer created the policy rights solely in the decedent's wife, it did so
only at decedent's request and because of the consideration supplied by
him.
Furthermore, the court in Gorman did not adequately consider whether,
by paying the premiums, the decedent made a transfer of a pro rata
share of the proceeds to his wife. To advance this view, the government
relied on Liebmann v. Hassett.41 The court, however, distinguished
Liebmann (and thereby evaded the issue) by saying:
Liebmann . . . is not authority for the proposition that payment of
premiums transfer an interest in an insurance policy in the absence of
1 a provision such as section 302(g) .. .As clearly indicated ... the
court relied on section 302(g) ... to equate the payment of premiums
by the decedent's wife to an addition or improvement made by her to the
Id. at 116-17.See Note, Inheritance and Estate Taxes-Insurance Policies-Premiiums Paid
in Contemplation of Death Held Taxable to the Estate of the Insured Only to the
Extent of the Amount Paid, 82 HIARv. L. Rnv. 1765, 1767 (1969); Note, Federal
Taxation-Section 2035, Internal Revenue Code of 1954-Life Insurance Proceeds
-Revenue Ride 67-463, 43 Tm. L. REv. 882, 892-93 (1969).
" 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945). The decedent transferred a life insurance policy
to his wife in December, 1935, and died in October, 1937. After the transfer, the
wife paid the two annual premiums. The wife stipulated that the policy was trans-
ferred in contemplation of death. The court decided that the interest transferred
was to be valued at the date of death. To determine the value, the court turned to
section 302 g (INT. REV. CODE of 1926, § 30 2 (g) ) which made life insurance payable
to the named beneficiary includible to the extent that it was "taken out' by the
decedent. The court excluded that part of the proceeds which were "purchased"
by the last two premiums paid by the wife.
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property transferred in an amount equal to a pro rata amount of the
proceeds.4
Thus, the court in Gorman concluded that it was only the existence of
section 30 2 (g) that resulted in its conclusion that there was a transfer
of a pro rata share of the proceeds. 43 Since the court found no necessary
relationship between the payment of premiums and the proceeds of the
policy, it was unable to see how the decedent could be characterized as
the motivating force behind the proceeds payment. The court concluded
that any and all rights to the proceeds came from the contract with the
insured, not from the payment of premiums.44 The court has failed to
look through form to substance.
In essence, the court in Gorman held that the payment of premiums by
a nonowner of a policy was not in any sense a transfer of an interest in
the policy or any of the contractual rights of that policy. Since in the
court's view only a transfer of these contractual rights would dictate the
inclusion of the proceeds of the policy in the gross estate, only the amount
of the premium was so included. "This analysis has the apparent virtue of
turning upon a transfer that was actually made: the husband's payment of
the premium."45 However, the court's analysis would seem to be correct
only if the premium payment were to be valued at the time of transfer
rather than at the insured's death. With the exception of cash transfers, 48
property transferred in contemplation of death is valued as of the date of
the transferor's death and not at the time of the transfer.' Since other
transfers, such as those of stocks and real property, are valued in the
taxable estate at the time of the donor's death, consistency dictates that
insurance be similarly treated. 8
As indicated, the problem is how to value a premium when the valuatio,
is made at the time of the insured's death and the beneficiary has become
entitled to the proceeds of the policy. The valuation favored by the court
in Gorman is incorrect. The premiums are the consideration furnished
for the insurance company's promise to pay the proceeds at the donor's
death. When the donor pays the premium, he is not merely giving the
"288 F. Supp. at 229-30. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e), T.D. 6501.
288 F. Supp. at 229-30.
"Id.
"Note, 82 HA.v. L. REv., supra note 40, at 1768.
Cf. Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947).
"See Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e), T.D. 6501.
" See generally Note, 82 HARv. L. Rzv., supra note 40.
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amount of the premium; his purpose is to insure that the contractual
benefits will be received by the beneficiary. Revenue Ruling 67-463
more clearly reflects the values that were actually transferred. This
ruling does not re-establish the old payment of premiums inclusion as only
the values transferred in the three years preceding the insured's death can
be included in the estate under section 2035. Thus, if the insured had
paid no premium and had no interest within the three years, none of the
proceeds of the policy could be included in the taxable estate.
The court of appeals in First National Bank (of Midland) failed to
shed any light on the controversy, and simply relied on Gorman and
Coleman to reach its decision. The court stated that "[w] e are not dealing
with a case in which the policy itself was transferred."4 As pointed out
earlier and re-emphasized in the discussion below in Coleman, this is a
dubious distinction.50 The court rejected the government's claim that
payment of life insurance premiums by decedent on policies owned by
his daughters, transferred "insurance benefits" to them for federal estate
tax purposes. The government acknowledged that the value of the de-
cedent's payments at the time they were made was their dollar value; how-
ever, the government explained that the "property or interest in property"
actually transferred to the daughters through the agency of the insurance
company, was not the cash amount of premium payments, but a "bundle
of rights" under the insurance contract. The government concluded that
the decedent made a transfer of rights in the same way that a purchaser of
real property in the daughters' names would transfer the property to them
rather than the consideration paid for it.51 The daughters therefore re-
ceived insurance benefits, not cash, and the payment of the premiums pro-
duced the proceeds. The court, relying on Gorman and Coleman, re-
jected the government's argument. 2 The government's argument in
Gorman and Coleman are equally applicable to the First National Bank
(of Midland) decision.
The majority opinion in Coleman displays on its face the weaknesses
of its arguments. The court stated:
Section 2035, -by its terms, applies only to a "transfer" of an interest
in property by a decedent. In Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327,
,9 423 F.2d at 1287.
50 See examples in note 35 supra.




respondent decreed that the mere payment of premiums operated as a
transfer of an interest in the proceeds of insurance-in this case, by
the decedent to the children. We disagree.
If the decedent had purchased a life insurance policy, initially re-
taining the ownership in herself, and thereafter assigned it to her
children, there clearly would have been a "transfer" of an interest in the
policy.53
In essence the majority holds that if the insured takes out an insurance
policy on his own life, then transfers it to the beneficiary and continues to
pay all the premiums, this is a transfer. But, if the beneficiary/owner takes
out the policy initially on the insured (as in Coleman), even though the
insured procures the policy-negotiates for the policy, takes the medical
exams, pays the premium- this is a different situation and therefore not
a transfer. The court makes one factual element- who first took out the
policy-the crucial factor as to whether there is a transfer. 54 Obviously,
the majority does not come to grips with the Commissioner's argument
for inclusion of a proportionate part of the proceeds. Instead, the majority
makes matters hinge upon pure formalism, a matter of no meaningful
substance to wit: Did decedent, after taking the medical exam and paying
the first premium, have the policy run to her and then at once transfer it
to her children; or, did decedent, after taking the medical exam and paying
the first premium, have the insurance agent draw the policy with it
running directly to her children? Surely, there should be no substantive
difference in the two situations.
In Chase, relied on by the Commissioner, the court gave the proper
interpretation and scope to the term "transfer."
Obviously, the word "transfer" in the statute, or the privilege which
may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense
as to refer only to the passing of particular items of property directly
from the decedent to the transferee. It must, we think, at least include
the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent
with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another.
Sec. 402(c) taxes transfers made in contemplation of death. It would
not, we assume, be seriously argued that its provisions could be evaded
by the purchase by a decedent from a third person of property, a savings
bank book for example, and its delivery by the seller directly to the
52 T.C. at 923.
"Id. at 927-28 (Raum, J., dissenting).
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intended beneficiary on the purchaser's death, or that the measure of
the tax would be the cost and not the value or proceeds at the time of
death.55
The majority in Coleman chose not to follow the substantive approach
of the Court in Chase and applied a formal, restrictive definition of trans-
fer, however, there were three well-reasoned dissents. 0 One of the
dissenters relied on the above quoted passage from Chase and then neatly
turned the majority's narrow formalism back upon it.57 He did this by
pointing out how strange it is to include only the amount of cash expended
in contemplation of death because that cash was never transferred as such
to the children. If "transfer," as the majority indicated, means that a
particular form of property must leave the decedent and arrive in that
same form in the hands of the beneficiary, then there was no more a
"transfer" of the cash than there was of the insurance proceeds. " This
same dissenter stated:
The real question is how to value that transfer. I think it should be
valued at what the amounts paid as premiums purchased in the way of
insurance protection and not at what was actually paid for that pro-
tection.59
Another dissenter summed up the failure of the majority viewpoint:
It seems to me that the majority opinion fans the flickering flame
of form. The legal and economic substance is indeed interred. Too
much emphasis is placed on formalities. Certainly the decedent had an
"interest" in the insurance policy on her life. Granted that her children
were "the record owners and beneficiaries," it was the decedent who
actually purchased the policy.0
There are several other considerations that must be pointed out con-
cerning Revenue Ruling 67-463. It should be emphasized that none of
the cited cases has provided an answer to the valuation problem where
the decedent initially took ownership of the policy and then transferred all
ownership to beneficiaries more than three years before death, but con-
278 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added).
" 52 T.C. 926-28 (dissenting opinions).




0 Id. at 928 (Dawson, J., dissenting).
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tinued to pay the premiums. The cases went no further than recognizing
that this was a transfer. Revenue Ruling 67-463 does provide an answer.
Therefore, estate planners should be aware that the ruling in this respect
has not been rejected and should be considered when planning estates.61
In addition to the strong arguments supporting the Commissioner's
view, there is one additional consideration that would dictate the adoption
of Revenue Ruling 67-463. If this ruling is not accepted certain in-
equalities will actually ensue. Consider the man who cannot obtain life
insurance because of age or medical history. He cannot benefit from the
Coleman rule. For example, if he desires to give real property to his
family as a source of income after he dies, and he does so in contemplation
of death, the value of the property at his death would be included in his
gross estate. If the property has increased in value, his estate tax burden
will also be increased. Under the Coleman situation, the man who is
insurable has a definite advantage. He can acquire an insurance policy with
the beneficiaries as initial owners, guaranteeing the payment of proceeds
far greater than his paid-in premiums, and will suffer an estate tax in-
clusion of only the amount of the actual cash premiums paid in contempla-
tion of death. Therefore, for the same dollar outlay and the same ultimate
values transferred, the insurable transferor will be able to transfer to his
family an increased amount of values by virtue of the lower estate tax cost.
Unless the revenue ruling is accepted, insurance will not be on the same
footing as all other property. Indeed, values passing by insurance will
receive more favorable tax treatment than all other forms of property
transmitted at death.
The decisions thus far on Revenue Ruling 67-463 amass a "mixed-
bag" of reasoning and create artificial distinctions. Realizing this, the
Commissioner is unlikely to give up. As a federal tax system must deal
in economic realties, the word "transferor" should be read to include those
persons who provide the consideration for a transfer. As one authority has
noted:
" For estate tax planners, it should be noted that the commissioner is still free
to insist upon the larger inclusion as set out in the ruling although he has lost the
three mentioned cases. As far as we here in the fourth circuit are concerned, we
must cope with the ruling until such time as this circuit has a court of appeals
decision on the matter. While it is true that the Revenue Act of 1969 made the
Tax Court a constitutional court, this does not mean that the Tax Court is bound
in all later cases by the decision of a single circuit court of appeals. Instead, the
present state of affairs is that the Tax Court is bound in later cases only by court
of appeals decisions involving cases in that particular circuit. Jack E. Golson, 54
T.C. 742 (1970).
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It seems reasonably clear that, if I direct my broker to purchase 100
shares of xyz stock in the name of my son and I pay the purchase
price, I have transferred 100 shares of xyz stock, not the dollars paid. 2
If a decedent seeks out the insurer, negotiates all the terms of the policy,
requests the insurer to create all the policy rights in another, and pays the
first premium which actually brings the contractual rights, as evidenced
by the policy issued, into existence, to say that this is not a "transfer" by
the decedent is to put form over substance. If the decedent continues to
pay the premiums, he remains the motivating force of the transaction, at
least with respect to the amount of proceeds attributable to the premium
payments within three years of his death. The premium was paid to the
insurer to purchase an asset-the asset being the insurer's promise to pay
the policy proceeds on the death of the insured. Inherent in life insurance
is the fact that the value of the company's promise to pay is always in-
creasing in value as death draws nearer. The decedent's payment to the
insurer is prompted by the knowledge that this manner of payment will
assure him of getting something more for his money, i.e., a benefit to the
donee greater than the dollars paid for the premium payment, in the form
of insurance proceeds in excess of the money paid.
On balance, the pro rata valuation (the Revenue Ruling's procedure
for valuation) seems to be the method which best carries out the
prior policies and decisions regarding the taxation of gifts in contempla-
tion of death. It takes cognizance of the donor's intent in paying the
premiums and does not violate the congressional intent that underlays
the amendments to section 2042.3
MICHAEL DONWELL GUNTER
Insurance-Life Insurance Applications: Opinion Answers or
Material Misrepresentations
With its recent decision in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v.
Barden,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit may have demon-
strated that the converse of the time-worn judicial apology, "hard cases
make bad law," is not necessarily true. Beneath Barden's deceptively
6 Stephens, The Clifford Shadow over the Federal Estate Tax, 4 GA. L. REv.
233, 243 (1970).
" See Note, 82 HAnv. L. Rxv., supra note 40, at 1771.
1424 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1970).
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simple exterior, one finds a questionable application of an established in-
surance law doctrine that is worthy of close scrutiny.
On September 29, 1966, Frank Barden, forty-eight years old and an
accountant by profession, applied for two policies on his life, each in the
amount of ten thousand dollars. His written application under a group
-plan for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants avowed
the completeness and truth of its contents, among which were the following
questions and Barden's corresponding answers:
10. Has the Person Proposed for Insurance ever been treated for or
had any indication of: Yes No
(d) Stomach or Intestinal Trouble? (x) ( )
11. Has the Person Proposed for Insurance within the past 5 years:
(a) Had or been advised to have a surgical Yes No
operation? (X) ()
(b) Been a patient in or advised to enter a hospital
or sanitorium? (X) ( )
(c) Consulted, been attended or examined by a
doctor or other practitioner? (X) ( )
12. Has the Person Proposed for Insurance any physical deformities,
impairments or ill health not recorded in answer to Question 10 or 11 ?
Yes No
( ) (X)
13. What are the complete details of all "Yes" answers to Questions
10, 11 and 12?
Condition, Details and Complete
Question Number of Attacks Duration of Recovery
No. (if operated, so state) Disability Month Year
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With the exception of the disclosed appendectomy, Barden omitted all
mention of his lengthy medical history which included diagnoses of a
ruptured blood vessel in the stomach or esophagus, cirrhosis of the liver,
and acute alcoholism.3 The policies were issued on October 1 and remained
in force until the insured's death from acute pancreatitis three months
later.
In the insurer's subsequent suit to rescind the policies because of
alleged material misrepresentations, the trial court granted its motion for
summary judgment and concluded that "in fact and in law the answers to
questions 12 and 13 ... were clearly false, with no waiver or estoppel on
the part of . . . [the company]; that said answers were material as a
matter of law. . . ."' On appeal, with the evidential facts not in dispute,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the
insurance company had failed to prove a misrepresentation and in any
event, the company by issuing the life insurance policy waived any claim
it had of material misrepresentation.5
Section 58-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides:
All statements or descriptions in any application for a policy of in-
surance, or in the policy itself, shall be deemed representations and not
warranties, and a representation, unless material or fraudulent, will
not prevent a recovery on the policy. 6
The purpose of this statute is to prevent the insurer from avoiding pay-
ment of honest losses upon technicalities and strict construction of the
insurance contract.7 Its use of the disjunctive, "or," is singularly im-
' Within one year after the disclosed appendicitis operation, Barden was read-
mitted to the same hospital on complaint of nausea and vomiting of blood. Follow-
ing two injections of whole blood and glucose, he remained there for over a
week pending a final diagnosis of a ruptured blood vessel in the stomach or esoph-
agus. Gall bladder difficulty had been suspected, but tests for the disorder proved
negative. On January 17, 1966, he consulted a different physician (Dr. Weeks) from
the one who had attended him in the past (Dr. Bell) in order to receive a general
check-up because of excessive fatigue. Dr. Weeks' examination resulted in a di-
agnosis of acute alcoholism with directions to remain on a special diet and abstain
completely from alcoholic indulgence. Three months later (and only five months
prior to his application for insurance), Barden was admitted to Rocky Mount Sani-
tarium Hospital due to abdominal pain, nausea and frequent regurgitation of food.
After a six day convalescence, he was released-this time with a diagnosis of cirrho-
sis of the liver. From this date until the time of his death he continued periodically
to consult Dr. Weeks, who, though noting some improvement in Barden's condition,
kept his original directions in force. Id. at 1008-12.
1Id. at 1007.5 Id. at 1006.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30 (1965).
'Garvey v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 153 F. Supp. 755, 757 (E.D.N.C. 1957); Cot-
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portant to the insurer, for it obviates the necessity of proving knowledge
or intent in a suit to rescind the policy because of a misrepresentation of a
material fact.' In North Carolina the issue of materiality is resolved by
the application of what has been termed the "individual insurer" rule :9 If
the knowledge or ignorance of the disputed fact would naturally influence
the judgment of the insurer in accepting the risk or in fixing the rate of
the premium, then that fact is deemed to be material."0 Ordinarily, the
resolution of this question is for the jury,1 but like many general rules,
this, too, is subject to exception. In an application for a policy of life
insurance, it is established law in North Carolina that written questions
relating to health, and written answers thereto, are considered material
as a matter of law.' In such cases, the only relevant inquiries for the jury
are whether the insured made the statement and if so, whether it was
false.' 3
In ruling upon the effect of the insured's answer to question 12, the
court neatly avoided the issue of materiality by treating the inquiry as if
it called only for an opinion. Basing its decision upon the physician's
optimistic reports of the preceding May and August,'4 the court concluded
that these reports
tingham v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co., 168 N.C. 259, 261, 84 S.E. 274, 275
(1915).8 See Walker v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp. 26, 29 (E.D.N.C.
1954); Tolbert v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 236 N.C. 416, 418, 72 S.E.2d 915,
917 (1952); Inman v. The Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, 211
N.C. 179, 181, 189 S.E. 496, 497 (1937).
'Note, Insurance: Concealment and Misrepresentation as Grounds to Avoid
Policy, 5 U.C.L.A.L. R!v. 332, 334 & n.15 (1958).
o E.g., Garvey v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 153 F. Supp. 755, 757 (E.D.N.C. 1957);
Tolbert v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 236 N.C. 416, 418-19, 72 S.E.2d 915, 917
(1952) ; Wells v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 211 N.C. 427, 429, 190 S.E. 744,
745 (1937); Gardner v. North State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 367, 374, 79
S.E. 806, 809 (1913).
"
1E.g., Senandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp. 366, 367 (E.D.N.C.
1966); Carroll v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 227 N.C. 456, 458, 42 S.E.2d 607, 608
(1947); Howell v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 189 N.C. 212, 217, 126 S.E. 603, 605-06
(1925).
1 E.g., Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 256 F. Supp. 366, 367 (E.D.N.C.
1966); Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 40, 125 S.E.2d 326,
332 (1962); Rhinehardt v. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 671, 673,
119 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1961).
' Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 40, 125 S.E.2d 326, 332
(1962); Rhinehardt v. North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 671, 673, 119
S.E.2d 614, 616 (1961).
, 424 F.2d at 1007.
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were certainly sufficient to justify a lay patient to believe that a few
weeks later, without an intervening sickness, he could say in good
faith that he was not then suffering from "any physical deformities,
impairments or ill health not recorded" in the catechism of 10 and 11.16
Although such an approach might be justified in light of Jeffress v. New
York Life Insurance Co., 6 it would appear that the court overstepped its
function in passing upon the insured's good faith. When weighed against
the evidence of the insured's medical history and his knowledge of the
past diagnoses, 1" his good faith in responding to question 12 would not
appear to be so overwhelming as to justify the appellate court's summary
decision in the insured's favor.
In addition, the court's analysis of question number 12 would seem to
permit recovery based upon the insured's bona fide belief of his apparent
state of health. Besides being out of harmony with a number of other
courts,'8 such an effect would seem to contradict Hines v. New England
Casualty Co.,"9 upon which Jeffress relies.20 In Hines the applicant for
insurance had stated that he was in " 'sound condition, mentally and
physically,' "21 despite his knowledge of an existing hernia. In the in-
surer's subsequent suit to rescind the policy, the court held for the de-
fendant, but added:
Few people are absolutely exempt from some variation from a perfect
condition, and, unless such variation is specifically asked about in the
application and denied, it is not a matter vitiating the policy, unless the
15Id. at 1008.
1674 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1935). "[W]here an inquiry as to physical condition or
previous illness calls for what is in effect an opinion by the applicant, an answer
made in good faith will not avoid the policy." Id. at 876.
1 7424 F.2d at 1007.
"
8E.g., Perkins v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 N.H. 383, 128 A.2d
207 (1956); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 198 Okla. 561, 180
P.2d 647 (1947); Grover v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 119 Vt. 246, 125
A.2d 571 (1956).
The rationale of the actual good health doctrine is that the parties, being free
to contract as they pleased, have in unmistakable terms made the fact of good
health a condition precedent to insurance coverage and that it is not within
the province of the court, whatever its sympathies, to remake the insurance
contract, either by deleting the good health clause or by reading into it
language which is not there.
Wick, The Good Health Clause-What it Says and What So.re Courts Say it Says,
23 INs. CoUNsEL J. 311, 313 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Wick].
19 172 N.C. 225, 90 S.E. 131 (1916).
2 74 F.2d at 876.
21 172 N.C. at 226, 90 S.E. at 132.
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variation was serious enough to affect his "soundness" so that any
one would say who knew the facts, "He is not a sound man. '22
Thus, what began in Hines as a third party's opinion of actual health
founded upon scienter has, in Jeffress, evolved to the point of permitting
the applicant's statement of apparent state of health founded upon good
faith belief.2" Although the approach taken in Jeffress (and thereby,
Barden) seems more in keeping with the policy behind section 58-30 of
the North Carolina General Statutes,2 4 the decision in Hines serves as a
reminder of the jury's role as the trier of fact. In Hines, the jury was
confined to determining whether the insured was or was not a sound man.
With the subsequent liberalization of the rule in Jeffress, the jury should
at least have been given the opportunity in Barden to decide whether the
insured had a bona fide belief that he was in good health, and if so, whether
such belief was reasonable.25
In passing upon the insurer's assertion of incompleteness in question
13, the court branded the inquiry as an "omnibus inquisition for details."26
Such a label is misleading in light of the fact that treatment for slight
or temporary indispositions may be regarded as immaterial where the
applicant fully discloses medical treatment for a serious ailment admin-
istered at or about the same time.2 7 Standing alone, therefore, question 13
requires that the applicant for insurance disclose only those facts and cir-
cumstances which, from a pragmatic standpoint, would be likely to affect
the insurer's judgment in accepting the risk or in fixing the rate of the
premium. Yet, in deciding that question thirteen was suitably answered
in the context of question 10, the court only concerned itself with the
insured's liver ailment. Nowhere did the court mention the diagnosis of
22 Id. (emphasis added).
"' But cf. Huffman v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 8 N.C. App. 186, 174 S.E.2d
17 (1970). Decided one month after Barden, this case seems to imply a continued
adherence to the actual good health doctrine. In support of this doctrine, it has
been argued that the average layman both knows and understands the distinction
between the term "good health" as used in daily conversation and "good health"
as used in formal insurance contracts. The latter is understood to be a condition
precedent to the enforceability of the contract and thereby could only mean actual
good health. Wick at 317.2
'N.C. GE. STAT. § 58-30 (1965). See p. 562 supra.
25 Cf. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. William J. Champion & Co., 350 F.2d 115, 126
(6th Cir. 1965) ; Union Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, - Ark. -- -, 449 S.W.2d 192, 195
(1970).
2 424 F.2d at 1008.
"'E.g., Jeffress v. New York Life Ins. Co., 74 F.2d 874, 877 (4th Cir. 1935);
Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 11, 173 S.E. 6, 8 (1934).
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a ruptured blood vessel in the stomach or esophagus or the insured's his-
tory of vomiting blood.2" Certainly the former condition constitutes
"stomach or intestinal trouble," and the facts of Thomas-Yelverton Co.
v. State Capitol Life Insurance Co.2" so closely parallel the latter symptom
as to raise grave questions as to the court's propriety in omitting it from
their analysis.
Similarly, the court explains away any culpability of the insured in
failing to enumerate the circumstances surrounding the affirmative answers
to question 11 by ruling that the insurer already had the equivalent of the
information it sought." Quoting from Gouldin v. Inter-Ocean Insurance
Co.,"' the court pointed out:
Knowledge of facts which the insurer has or should have had con-
stitutes notice of whatever an inquiry would have disclosed and is
binding on the insurer. The rule applies to insurance companies that
whatever puts a person on inquiry amounts in law to "notice" of such
facts as an inquiry pursued with ordinary diligence and understanding
would have disclosed.3 2
Although this argument is entitled to some weight in light of the in-
sured's limited response to question 13, which in turn left his affirmative
replies to question 11 unanswered, the court destroys much of its force by
an earlier observation. In ruling that the insured had answered question
11 as fully as its broad phraseology would permit, the court admitted:
Each of these rejoinders could well have been referable to the ap-
pendectomy. Likewise they could have related to the medical attention
he received for liver troubles or to any of the possible maladies not
appearing in question 10. No deception or half-truth is proved here.83
Although no deception or half-truth was proved in question 11, this same
statement highlights the fallacy of the argument that the insurer was in
possession of facts sufficient to put it on notice in question 13. It is
true that insurance contracts are to be construed liberally in favor of the
28 424 F.2d at 1007.
29238 N.C. 278, 77 S.E.2d 692 (1953). Here, the insured's negative response to
a question pertaining to the existence of any diseases of the stomach was held to
afford sufficient grounds for rescission on the insurer's showing that the insured had
experienced the vomiting of blood in connection with a peptic ulcer.
80 424 F.2d at 1009.8t248 N.C. 161, 102 S.E.2d 846 (1958).
82424 F.2d at 1010.
3 Id. at 1009.
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insured.8" But though the sword may cut sharper on the side of the in-
sured, this does not necessarily imply that it cannot be double-edged at all.
Just as the responses to question 11 might have alluded to either the
insured's appendectomy or liver ailment, so too might the limited response
to question 13 have indicated that the affirmative answers in question 11
were similarly limited to question 10(d). Inasmuch as the opinion of the
individual insurer is favored over that of similar or reasonably prudent
insurers upon the issue of materiality,'- it would seem reasonable to afford
the specific insurer an opportunity to show its interpretation of a disputed
answer when the representation is deemed material as a matter of law.
Even assuming that the insurer did have a duty of inquiry, it could
only be held to those facts which an investigation pursued with ordinary
diligence would have disclosed.36 Had it undertaken such an inquiry,
it is highly doubtful that it would have obtained the vital information with
which it was ultimately charged. The only details disclosed in question
13 concerned the insurer's hospitalization at Memorial Hospital under
the care of Dr. Bell. Although an investigation of the hospital records
would have revealed the insured's subsequent admittance for the vomiting
of blood, it would have shown that he left the hospital apparently well and
with no indications of his extensive liver ailment.37 Nor is there any sug-
gestion either that Dr. Bell was aware of the insured's later treatment by
Dr. Weeks or that Memorial Hospital had any record of the insured's con-
finement at the other sanitarium.38
In its concluding remarks the court holds that even if the insured had
concealed material facts, the insurer waived the defect and elected to treat
them as immaterial.3 9 It is clear that an insurer may waive provisions that
are inserted in an insurance contract for its benefit. 4' By acting on an
answer that is unresponsive or manifestly incomplete, an insurer precludes
later objection on its part.41 "But ... the mere fact that the insurer has
" E.g., National Bank v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 125 F.2d 920, 923 (4th Cir. 1942) ;
Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 249 N.C. 383, 386, 106 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1959) ;
Mills v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 439, 441, 187 S.E. 581, 582 (1936).
Note, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv., supra note 9, at 334 & n.15.
Note, Itsurance-Isurer's Duty-Investigation for Suspected Fraud Prior to
Issuance of Life Policy, 10 Anx. L. REv. 499, 499-500 (1956).
37 424 F.2d at 1007.
" Id. at 1012 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 1010.
"' E.g., Bray v. North Carolina Police Voluntary Benefit Ass'n, 258 N.C. 419,
424, 128 S.E.2d 766, 770 (1963) ; Widows Fund of Sudan Temple v. Umphlett, 246
N.C. 555, 560, 99 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1957).
"Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U.S. 183, 190 (1887).
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knowledge that some of the statements in an application are incorrect does
not of itself put the insurer on inquiry, and charge it with knowledge of
all the facts that an inquiry, would disclose."'4 2 Rather, it is the character
of the information possessed by the insurer which is determinative.4"
From the facts disclosed in the application, the insurer would have
no occasion to suspect that the physician's recent discovery of the appli-
cant's physical defects indicated an uninsurable condition. Instead, the
more reasonable inference was that the affirmative answers in question 11
pertained to the applicant's only previous illness disclosed in the application,
namely, the appendectomy in 1964. Such an inference is clearly supported
in light of Barden's assertion of good health at the time of the application.
These facts being insufficient to impose a duty of inquiry44 and an in-
vestigation being unlikely to yield the vital information, it is difficult to
justify the court's decision on the waiver issue. Waiver, being the volun-
tary relinquishment of a known right,45 necessarily requires knowledge of
the existence of that right and an intent to surrender it.40 Without the
requisite character of information (and no reason to obtain it), the in-
surer could hardly be held to have intentionally relinquished his equitable
right to rescind.
Such a result-oriented decision as Barden is particularly difficult to
reconcile with the basic notion of uberrima fides. Since the parties deal at
arms length, the insurer must of necessity rely upon the applicant's good
faith for its knowledge of the facts.47 Prior to Barden a prime deterrent
against a breach of this good faith was the knowledge on the part of the
insured that should his misrepresentations be discovered within the con-
testable period, his wager with the insurer would yield no more than
his total investment. The decision in Barden, however, effectively re-
duces the time allowed for the insurer's challenge and, in so doing, serves
notice upon the clever but uninsurable applicant that the odds in his favor
have been increased. By removing several questionable issues from the
" Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hawley, 123 F.2d 479, 482-83 (4th
Cir. 1941) (applying North Carolina law).
I8 d. at 483.
"In Hawley the insurer inquired and learned that the insured had been cured of
an affliction prior to the application but was not precluded from establishing a de-
fense of a related illness that was undisclosed by both the insured and the prior
investigation.
"16A J. APPLEmAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTicE § 9081 (1968).
Brady v. Funeral Benefit Ass'n, 205 N.C. 5, 7, 169 S.E. 823, 824 (1933).
'" Comment, Material Misrepresentation As a Requirement For Rescission of
Insurance Contracts, 73 DicK. L. REv. 250 (1969).
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consideration of the jury, the policy manifested by section 58-30 of the
North Carolina General Statutes has been stretched to an extreme.
WILLIAM W. MAYWHORT
Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions and Housing
Code Enforcement
The low income tenant in North Carolina must rely primarily upon
municipal housing codes to ameliorate substandard housing conditions.'
Although enforcement of code regulations has to some extent elevated the
quality of existing urban housing, the process of repair under the codes,
particularly for the benefit of the low income tenant, is hampered by the
probability of considerable delay.
There may be delay between the first appearance of the defect and
tne inspector's knowledge of the defect. Since a limited number of in-
spectors must inspect not only those dwellings suspected of being sub-
standard but also all other housing in the city,2 a general program of area
inspections is tedious and time consuming. Therefore, inspectors are
forced to rely upon reports of code violations from interested parties as an
additional means of discovering violations. A tenant of adequate means,
having a bargaining power equal to that of the landlord, is likely to repair
himself or prompt his landlord to repair a serious defect rather than
reporting it and awaiting municipal action under the enforcement process.
But a low income tenant can seldom undertake repair; furthermore, a
paucity of decent housing3 may discourage him from antagonizing his
landlord by reporting code violations.
The landlord might also retard the process of repair after the defect
has been discovered by the inspector. A recalcitrant landlord of slum
property will hesitate to expend money for repair of premises of only
tenable value4 and may take advantage of methods available under the
Enabling legislation for municipal housing codes is found in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160-182 (Supp. 1969).
For example, there are six building inspectors to implement a program of city-
wide housing inspection for the city of Durham. When the program is completed,
it will have taken about ten years. Interview with Building Inspector for the City of
Durham, North Carolina, Dec. 10, 1970.
The North Carolina General Assembly has recognized that the state suffers
from a housing shortage and that a substantial number of existing dwellings are in
a substandard condition. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1966) (legislation enabling
the establishment of municipal housing authorities).
'See Symposhnz--Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAV. L. Rnv.
801 (1965).
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housing codes to postpone enforcement.5 After the inspector notifies the
landlord of the nature of the violation, the landlord is entitled to a hearing
before the inspector," and if necessary, he may then be ordered to correct
the defect within a specified time.' If the landlord fails to repair within
the time allotted he may be granted an extension of the time.' If after the
extension he fails to repair, he may be subject to a criminal penalty,' and
the city may make the repairs at his expense 0 or force him to vacate the
building."- However, the need for low-rent urban housing of any condi-
tion as well as a general sympathy toward landlords may contribute to the
reluctance to employ these extreme measures of code enforcement.' 2 Dur-
ing the periods of delay both before and after municipal recognition of the
defect, the low income tenant must endure disrepair or quit the premises.13
He can do little under the common law to stimulate accelerated action by
his landlord.
Ignoring the possible disparities of bargaining power between the
' The enforcement process provided by the codes may involve uncomfortable
delay for the tenant. To begin with, the officials must locate the owner or provide
adequate means of notice of the violation if his whereabouts are unknown. E.g.,
DURHAm, N.C., CODE § 10-8(9) (Supp. 1969). Of course, the owner must have
an opportunity to contest the violation and adequate time to comply with an order
of the inspector. E.g., DURHAm, N.C., CODE §§ 10-8(5)-(7) (Supp. 1969). There
may be further delay if the owner chooses to petition to the superior court for an
injunction in restraint of carrying out an order. E.g., DURHrAM, N.C., CODE
§ 10-8(8) (Supp. 1969). Moreover, the inspector may not be permitted to exercise
his duty to correct or remove a particular dwelling in violation of the code unless
the city council orders by ordinance the inspector to proceed. E.g., DURHAm, N.C.,
CODE § 10-10 (Supp. 1969).
SE.g., DURHIAm, N.C., CODE § 10-8(4) (Supp. 1969).
'.E.g., DURHAm, N.C., CODE § 10-8(5) (Supp. 1969). The time within which
the owner must comply is left largely within the discretion of the inspector.
'E.g., DURHAm, N.C., CODE §§ 10-8(6), (7) (Supp. 1969).
'E.g., DURHAm, N.C., CODE §§ 10-8(6), (14) (Supp. 1969) ; GRmENSBORO, N.C.,
CODE § 10-28 (1961). However, criminal penalties are rarely imposed upon the
landlord. See Symposium, 78 HARv. L. REv., supra note 4, at 822-23. For example,
in Durham criminal penalties have been imposed for violation of the housing code
three times in the last eleven years. Interview with Building Inspector for the
City of Durham, North Carolina, Dec. 10, 1970.
E.g., DURHAiM, N.C., CODE § 10-8(11) (Supp. 1969). Durham does not resort
to this remedy. Interview with Building Inspector for the City of Durham, North
Carolina, Dec. 10, 1970.
"
1E.g., DURHAm, N.C., CODE § 10-8(10) (Supp. 1969).
" In Durham, the owner who does not comply with an order to repair is gen-
erally given a continuance of the time originally granted for repairs. Interview with
Building Inspector for the City of Durham, North Carolina, Dec. 10, 1970.
" The tenant himself may repair less serious defects, but for the low income
tenant even minor repairs may be burdensome. California, for example, allows the
tenant to make limited repairs and deduct the costs from rent payments. CAL.
CiV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954).
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landlord and the tenant, 4 the common law position was that the doctrine
of caveat emptor applied to the lessee, 5 and in the absence of a covenant
to repair the landlord had neither a duty to put the premises in a suitable
condition prior to the lease'6 nor to maintain them thereafter.' The
rationale for this position was that a tenant was not required to lease
premises when he was dissatisfied with their condition, and if the land-
lord became responsible for disrepair subsequent to the tenant's going into
possession, the tenant could abandon the premises and claim he had been
constructively evicted by his landlord.' North Carolina courts have not
rejected or significantly altered archaic common law concepts to cope with
housing problems augmented by increasing urbanization. The tenant in
North Carolina cannot claim a constructive eviction to recover rent paid
for a defective dwelling unless he abandons the premises,'" but the difficulty
of finding alternative low-rent housing practically precludes abandon-
ment. Furthermore, if the tenant relies upon the remedy of constructive
eviction, he takes the risk that the court will not find in his favor after
he has relinquished possession. In North Carolina, for example, gradual
disrepair of the premises when the lessor has not covenanted to repair does
not justify a claim of constructive eviction. 0 Consequently, if the tenant
wishes to remain in possession, he is deprived of any effective remedy
to force the landlord to comply with the dictates of the applicable municipal
housing code.
North Carolina courts have been extremely reluctant to allow recovery
by the tenant for personal injuries -sustained as a result of a hazardous
condition of the premises.2 ' Even if the tenant has notified the landlord
of defects and the landlord has agreed to repair but fails to do so, he is
not liable for the tenant's injuries.' This rule extends to the situation
where the landlord has specifically covenanted to repair (a covenant
rarely undertaken in slum areas) ;2 the courts have reasoned that corn-
"' See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Solme Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. RE v. 629 (1943).
" See Note, Landlord and Tenant-Recent Erosions of Caveat Emptor in the
Leasing of Residential Housing, 49 N.C.L. REv. 175 (1970).
" 1 AmER-icAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).1 Id. § 3.78.
8 Id. § 3.51.
19 Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 690, 173 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1970).
20 Carolina Mortgage Co. v. Massie, 209 N.C. 146, 183 S.E. 425 (1936).
-
1Rickman Mfg. Co. v. Gable, 246 N.C. 1, 97 S.E.2d 672 (1957).
" Moss v. Hicks, 240 N.C. 788, 83 S.E.2d 890 (1954).
2" See Schoshinski, Remedies for the Indigent Tenant: Proposals for Change,
54 GE o. L.J. 519, 521 (1966).
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pensation for physical injury is not assumed by the parties to the
covenant. 4 The position advocated in North Carolina reflects the
anomaly that a landlord who is already subject to a duty to the mu-
nicipality to keep the premises in a safe condition is immune from liability
to his tenant even though he has been negligent or dilatory in performing
this duty.25 Thus, the landlord may delay the process of code enforcement
indefinitely without fear of tort liability due to his inaction.
Recently, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Thompson v. Shoe-
maker,20 reaffirmed the common law position and held that violations of
the housing code did not alter established common law doctrine. The
court required abandonment of the premises to support a claim of con-
structive evictionI and ruled that a failure to abandon constituted con-
tributory negligence barring any claim for physical injury., The court
failed to accept the plaintiff's argument that common law principles re-
quiring abandonment are not fairly applicable because of the shortage of
adequate housing by refusing to take judicial notice of any aspect of the
city's housing situation. The court should have taken such notice since
the legislature took notice of the scarcity of decent housing when it
passed enabling legislation for the establishment of public housing au-
thorities.3 0 Furthermore, the housing codes themselves provide that
extensive deterioration may occur before destruction of the building
becomes necessary."- Arguably, implicit in such provisions is the realiza-
tion that current housing shortages demand that existing dwellings be
retained if at all possible. It is interesting to note that in Thompson the
unlawful defects of the dwelling had remained unrepaired for about a
year, 2 and yet the tenant's only feasible remedy was to passively rely upon
normal procedures of code enforcement.
2
' Jordan v. Miller, 179 N.C. 73, 75, 101 S.E. 550, 551 (1919).2 New York has held the landlord liable for injuries to the tenant when the
proximate cause of the injuries was a defect in violation of the building code.
Babba v. Yonkers Natl Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 829, 37 N.Y.S.2d 561
(1942) (mem.). See also Crawford v. Palomar, 7 Mich. App. 21, 151 N.W.2d
236 (1967).2 7 N.C. App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970).2
"Id. at 690, 173 S.E.2d at 630.
281d.
20 Id.
, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1966).
21For example, the Code of the City of Wilmington provides that a dwelling
may be repaired if the cost of repair does not exceed fifty per cent of the value
of the building. WILMINGToN, N.C., CODE §§ 6-59, -60 (1961). The City of Greens-
boro allows repair if it does not exceed sixty per cent of the value of the building.
GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 10-23(b) (1961).2 7 N.C. App. at 689, 173 S.E.2d at 629.
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If a tenant chooses to rely solely upon the process of code enforcement,
he should personally report defects to code officials since area inspections
may not uncover the defect for years.3 However, to dispose of a trouble-
some tenant and to set an example for other tenants, the landlord would
be within his common law right to evict the tenant who reports a violation
after the expiration of his term34 or to raise the rent so that the tenant
could no longer afford to rent the premises.'5 North Carolina has sum-
mary ejectment statutes that set up the procedure by which a landlord may
remove a tenant who holds over after his term has ended or who has failed
to pay rent.-6 These statutes do not provide for the defense of a retaliatory
motive on the part of the landlord. In North Carolina, the summary eject-
ment procedure is the exclusive remedy for removal and the landlord cannot
employ self-help to evict a tenant.37 Thus, the North Carolina legislature
could, by foreclosing the right to summary ejectment in cases of retaliatory
eviction or rent increase, protect the tenant who reports a housing code
violation.
Even in the absence of legislative action, the North Carolina courts
should consider the decisions of other jurisdictions and hold that, as a
matter of statutory construction and for reasons of public policy, retaliatory
evictions cannot be permitted.38 Allowing the landlord to rely upon the
summary ejectment statutes to thwart housing code enforcement would
frustrate the saluatory purpose sought to be achieved by the state legisla-
tion enabling municipalities to adopt housing codes.39 The difficulty with
this argument is that any restriction of the summary ejectment statutes by
the enabling statute must be implied since the statute makes no reference
to the problem of evictions. Nevertheless, the courts might prevent re-
taliatory evictions without attempting to ascertain legislative intent simply
by deciding that such evictions are against public policy.40 Efficient opera-
"See note 2 supra.
1 AmuERcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.33 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-14 (1966), which sets out the applicable notice necessary to teminate
a tenancy.
" 1 Az&EaicAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.64 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-26 to -37 (1966).
"' North Carolina has held that a landlord is liable for damages when he employs
self-help to evict a holdover tenant. Mosseller v. Deaver, 106 N.C. 494, 11 S.E.
529 (1889).
" See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-182 (Supp. 1969).
,Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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tion of code enforcement procedures necessitates a freedom of access by
aggrieved parties to enforcement officials.
Perhaps the courts have valid reasons for declining to qualify the
common law right of the landlord, for in the absence of relevant and
comprehensive statutes, judicial decisions cannot immediately resolve
exigent issues.4 Statutory reform in North Carolina could prompt more
effective enforcement of the housing codes by granting the tenant the
right to refuse to pay rent to the landlord for a dwelling that violates the
housing code.' To allow the tenant complete freedom from payment of
rent would permit him to abuse the protection intended by the statute
since he would have nothing to lose by committing waste and remaining
in possession with no bona fide intention to pay rent. On the other hand,
a rent escrow provision would require the tenant to pay rent as usual;
however, this rent would go into the fund rather than directly to the land-
lord.43 This fund could then be applied to the cost of any necessary
repairs. To be given maximum effect a statute providing for a rent escrow
agreement should be supplemented by a provision specifically prohibiting
the landlord from evicting the tenant, raising the rent, or requiring addi-
tional lease obligations in retaliation for the tenant's reporting code viola-
tions. 4
4
Because the landlord normally has access to records of expenses re-
lated to the property, to evidence of proposed changes of investments or
use of the property, or has knowledge of specific instances of waste by
the tenant, the burden of going forward on the issue of a retaliatory
motive should shift to the landlord after the tenant has established his
reporting of code violations and the subsequent attempted evictions by
the landlord. Following an attempted wrongful eviction or after the
establishment of the escrow agreement the presumption of a retaliatory
motive should dissipate only after the passage of a reasonable amount of
time.45 Of course, if the owner wishes to remove his property from the
"' One issue not decided in Habib was how long the tenant could remain in
possession after he had reported housing code violations. The dissenting opinion
strongly argued that the court should have waited for legislative action. Id. at
703-05.
" See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 127F (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 170-92.1 (Supp. 1969) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp, 1970);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-20-10 (1968).
"'E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 127F (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1970).
"E.g., MIcH. STAT. AN. §27A.5646 (Supp. 1970).
" See ABF MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407(1) (Tent.
Draft 1969). The Model Code provides for a period of six months.
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housing market, no construction of the statute should interfere with his
right to do so.
The suggested statutory provisions would involve an extremely deli-
cate balancing of the rights of the landlord and tenant. But if interpreted
in light of the policies underlying existing municipal housing codes, the
laws would not unduly restrict property rights. The end result would be
more effective compliance with housing code standards, and for the land-
lord who maintains these standards, his common law rights against the
tenant would be preserved.
CHRISTIAN NESS
Labor Law-Duty to Bargain About Changes in Benefits for
Retired Employees
Suppose that employees, who are members of a collective bargaining
unit, are permitted, pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, to remain members of an employee group health insurance plan
with the employer making monthly contributions for them when they
Tetire. Congress thereafter enacts legislation that entitles these retired
employees to certain health care benefits that duplicate some of the bene-
fits of the group plan. The employer, concerned about the welfare of his
former employees, wishes to substitute new benefits for those duplicated.
Does he, under the Labor Management Relations Act (the Act),' have
a duty to bargain with the union representing the employees about the
proposed change? This question arose for the first time in the history of
the Act in the recent case of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div. v.
NLRB.2
Since 1949, Local Union No. 1, Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers
of America, had been the exclusive bargaining representative of Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Company's employees at the Barberton, Ohio plant and
mine.3 A contract was negotiated in 1950 that included provisions for a
group health insurance plan for employees; there was also an oral agree-
ment that retired employees could participate in the plan but would bear
the entire cost of such participation. In 1959 an improvement in the
129 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
"427 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. Feb. 23,
1971) (Nos. 910, 961).8Id. at 938.
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coverage was negotiated and the participation rights of retirees was re-
duced to writing. In 1962 a contract was negotiated that required the
company to contribute two dollars per month to the plan for employees
retiring after the effective date of the contract; this contract also provided
for mandatory retirement at age sixty-five. A contract signed in 1964
provided for an increase in the company's contribution for retired em-
ployees to four dollars per month with a stipulation that the company
might rescind the increase should pending Medicare legislation be enacted.
Shortly after the enactment of Medicare, 4 the union notified the company
that it wished to engage in mid-term bargaining about the health plan for
retired employees. When the parties finally met the company announced
that it would, pursuant to the contract, discontinue the increased payments
when Medicare took effect and that it would remove the retired employees
from the group health plan, paying them three dollars per month for
supplemental Medicare benefits in lieu of the two dollars per month con-
tribution. Challenging the union's right to bargain about the matter at a,
the company subsequently decided to offer the retirees, on an individual
basis, the option of remaining in the group plan or electing to take the
three dollar per month payment from the company. This offer was made
to 190 retirees; fifteen elected to take the supplemental benefit payments.
During this time the union continued to insist that the company bargain
with it about any changes and finally filed charges with the NLRB
alleging that the company's actions were unfair labor practices prohibited
by the Act.
Specifically, the company was charged with violating section 8 (a) (5)
of the Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."' Section 9(a) provides that
the bargaining representative chosen by the majority of the employees in
an appropriate unit shall be the exclusive representative of all the em-
ployees in that unit for purposes of collectively bargaining about rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. The
company's actions were said to have violated its duty to bargain in three
ways. First, the company's action was presumably a unilateral modifica-
"Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (Supp. III 1965-67).
'National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA] §8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.§ 158(a)(5) (1964). There was also a charge that the company had violated
section 8(a) (1), which forbids interference, coercion, or restraint of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively.
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tion of an existing, valid collective bargaining agreement and thus was a
per se violation of the duty to bargain." Second, the retirement benefits
in question were so inextricably bound up with the wages and other
conditions of employment of the active employees that the company pre-
sumably had a duty to bargain with the representatives of the active
employees about such changes. Third, the retirees were employees within
the meaning of the Act, and the union was their collective bargaining
representative. Therefore, since their benefits were wages, the company
had a duty to bargain about any changes in their benefits.
The Board found the company guilty of the charged violations ap-
parently on all three grounds and ordered the company to cease and desist
from refusing to bargain with the union on the subject.' The company
sought review of the Board's order in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. The court, largely
confining its decision to whether the company could be required to bargain
with the union as the representative of the retried employees,8 failed to
agree with the Board on any theory and denied enforcement of the order.'
Reading the appropriate sections of the Act it appears that in order to
find that an employer has a duty to bargain with a union about modifica-
tions in the benefits of retirees four conditions must be satisfied; (1) the
retirees in question must be "employees" within the meaning of section
2(3) of the Act;1" (2) they must be the employer's employees within the
- NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), provides in part: "the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate
or modify such contract [without bargaining about it] ... "
'71 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1969).
'The court dismissed the theory that the company's action was a unilateral
modification of the collective bargaining contract by implying that the retiree's
benefits vest upon retirement as personal contract rights, and that it was the per-
sonal contract rights that had been modified by agreement of the parties. 427
F.2d at 942 n.9.
The court did not mention the possibility of upholding a violation of the duty
to bargain with the active employees on the ground that the company's action uni-
laterally modified the base group of the employees' group health plan. See Combined
Paper Mills, Inc., 70 L.R.R.M. 1209 (1969). No reason for this omission appears
in the opinion, and the Board has reasserted this position in its petition for cer-
tiorari. 75 LAu. REL. R P. 284, 285 (Dec. 7, 1970).
" The Board has decided to adhere to its ruling pending resolution by the
Supreme Court. See 75 LAB. RPEL. REP. 201 (Nov. 9, 1970).
" 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) provides:
The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited
to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly
states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
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meaning of section 8(a) (5) of the Act; (3) they must be members of
the certified bargaining unit;' and (4) their benefits must be included in
the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.'
1 3
The language of section 2(3) neither specifically includes nor ex-
cludes retired employees. It is settled that Congress did not use the word
as a term of art having a definite meaning, 4 and apparently Congress did
not anticipate this problem so that legislative intent provides little help in
deciding whether the term is broad enough to include retirees. 5 There
are numerous cases, dealing with other labor problems, which find that
persons who would not ordinarily be thought to be described by the
term "employees" are covered by the Act, but these cases deal primarily
with workers who are likely to be employed in the near future.' 0 There are
a few cases, however, holding that "employees" as used in section 302(c)
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of
any family or person at his home, or any individal employed by his parent
or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor,
or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time,
or by any person who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964) (emphasis added). The italicized words appear in
612 Stat. 137 as "this Act."
1129 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964), makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees, subject to the provisions [of section 9(a)]."
"
2 NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), provides in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ....
"' There is a mandatory duty to bargain about subjects included in the phrase
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).1 4NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944).
Legislative histories of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts compiled by the
Board give no indication that Congress in any way anticipated this problem. NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT, 1935 (1949); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1948).
1 E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (applicants for
employment); Whiting Corp. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1952) (men laid
off not reasonably expected to return to work not employees); Goodman Lumber
Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 304 (1967) (person who has quit); Local 872, International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 163 N.L.R.B. 586 (1967)' (hiring hall registrants).
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of the Act 7 includes retired employees." One of these, Blassie v. Kroger
Co.,' 9 conceptualizes the term employee as referring to one being in an em-
ployment relationship with another. That relationship contemplates an ex-
change of work for wages with reciprocal performances normally occurring
at the same point in time. Should the performances be separated in time
however the relationship continues until performance by both sides is
completed. Thus a retired employee retains, to some extent, the status of
employee until all benefits-deferred wages 2 -due him are paid.
The court in Pittsburgh did not directly challenge the assertion that
persons not currently in the active service of an employer could be covered
by the term "employee." It chose to draw the line at section 8(a) (5),
which speaks of "representatives of his employees."'" The court noted
that this language has not been given the same expansive reading accorded
the word "employee" without the possessive pronoun. So far as the court
was concerned retirement "is a complete and final severance of employ-
ment."22 Thus, even if retirees are "employees" this severance from the
employer means that they are not "his employees." The application of the
Blassie rationale was rejected by the court because it viewed that case
as an ad hoc decision necessary to carry out the obvious intent of section
302 (c) of the Act. However, there seems to be no necessity for rejecting
the rationale in Blassie to protect the obvious purpose of the restrictive
language of section 8(a) (5) -limiting the employer's duty to bargain
to persons he has employed as opposed to those he has not yet employed
or those employed by others. Nevertheless, the Board, as the court pointed
" 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1964). Section 302 of the Act is generally concerned
with preventing the misuse of bargaining power for the personal or political pur-
poses of union officials; it therefore restricts certain loans and payments by em-
ployers to, inter alia, employee representatives, labor organizations and their officials.
Subsection (c) excepts certain types of payments including certain types of wel-
fare funds; it provides in part:
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable ... with respect to
money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such
representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such
employer, and their families and dependents ....
Id. (emphasis added).
8 E.g., Garvison v. Jensen, 355 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1966); Blassie v. Kroger
Co., 345 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965).
10 345 F.2d 58, 68-71 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.).
20 Benefits to be enjoyed upon retirement are considered deferred wages for
the purposes of the Act. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), enforced, 170
F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964) (emphasis added).
22 427 F.2d at 944.
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out, has never permitted retirees to vote in certification elections but has
excluded them from the bargaining unit. However, the cases cited by the
court2 are of doubtful value. The most recent case involved a retired
employee whose only connection with the employer was that he worked
irregularly to make the maximum allowed by Social Security regulations;
he was excluded because of the irregularity of his work. 4 The other cases
were all decided before the Board determined that retirement benefits were
a mandatory subject of bargaining with active employees.2 5
Since there is no duty to bargain about the interests of those not in
the bargaining unit,26 the continuing employment concept may be used
to avoid that pitfall by stating that retired employees have never com-
pletely left the bargaining unit. The court, however, believed that retirees
have left the unit and, furthermore, that they lack the economic credentials
to reenter it. In the court's view retired employees are not included in
the description of the certified unit,2 7 and, in case the Board may be said
to have changed the unit, such action would be inappropriate because the
"appropriate unit has economic incidents which the Board simply cannot
modify by fiat or enlarge by sympathy.) 28
Finally, the subject of bargaining-modification of the retirees' bene-
fits-must be wages, hours or other terms and conditions of employment.
Retirement benefits are deferred wages and are treated no differently than
those of active employees if the continuing employment concept is accepted.
In the court's view, however, they are no longer wages as such but vested
contract rights,29 outside the field of industrial relations.
On the basis of its textual analysis of the provisions of the Act, the
"Taunton Supply Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962); Public Service Corp., 72
N.L.R.B. 224 (1947); J.S. Young Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1174 (1944); W.D. Byron &
Sons, 55 N.L.R.B. 172 (1944).
"Taunton Supply Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
" The Board decided in Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948), that retire-
ment benefits were actually a form of wages and therefore a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
2 Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957).
"'The certified bargaining unit was "[a]ll employees of the Employer's plant
and limestone mine at Barberton, Ohio working on hourly rates, including group
leaders who work on hourly rates of pay, but excluding salaried employees and
supervisors within the meaning of the Act." 427 F.2d at 938.
"Id. at 946. The court did not describe those incidents; it is presumed that
they are not present here.
29 For a discussion of how vested these benefits may, or may not be in various
situations see B. AARoN, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER
PRIVATE PENSION PLANS (1961).
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court's position emerges as a defender of the plain meaning of language?-
retired means no longer employed and retirement benefits are contract
rights, not wages. The Board, on the other hand, is more liberal with
the language and feels that retirement under a collective bargaining
agreement providing retirement 'benefits is not a complete severance of
the employment relationship, thus leaving room for a continuing obligation
to bargain during the life of the benefits. Neither view is completely un-
reasonable, nor patently correct; therefore, recourse must be had to the
purposes of the Act and the economic facts of the situation. The Board
is the expert to which Congress has given the duty of making such
decisions; it has broad discretion and should be overruled by reviewing
courts only when there is no substantial evidence to support its position,
or when it contravenes the provisions of the Act. 1
The Act is primarily designed to promote industrial peace and stability
by encouraging collective bargaining."2 The adequacy of retirement
benefits poses a threat to industrial peace in that retired employees have
very few places to look, other than to the employer or the community,
should their benefits prove to be inadequate. Particularly in this day of
confrontation, it is not unlikely that industrial peace literally could be
shattered by disgruntled pensioners; picketing alone could persuade many
employees to refuse to go to work. The Act does not require the Board to
await actual disruption or violence but allows it to be anticipated.3 3
Additionally, the experience of the retired employees, viewed from the
standpoint of the active employees, undoubtedly has an impact upon the
willingness of active employees to accept mandatory retirement as well
as a given pension plan; thus, their insecurity may well lead to industrial
strife. Indeed Congress has recognized as much by stating that employee
welfare and pension benefit plans are an "important factor affecting the
stability of employment and the successful development of industrial rela-
tions.""4 Collective bargaining is "the framework established by Congress
as most conducive to industrial peace."3 5 The Supreme Court has also
unanimously indicated that "[i] ndustrial experience is not only reflective
0 "There was nothing strained or unnatural in this interpretation." 427 F.2d at
943.
" NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1947) ; NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
" Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964); Carey
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
" NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 326 (1940).
"Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1964).
" Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
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of the interests of labor and management in the subject matter but is
also indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargain-
ing process."36 There is evidence that many industries do bargain about
modification of retirees' benefits; indeed, the parties in the instant case
did so for a number of years.17
The court adopted a somewhat different approach to the purpose of
the Act, emphasizing the equalization of competing economic forces. The
Act's "purpose is not artificially to create or manufacture new economic
forces," and "[r] etired employees have no economic or bargaining power
within this system."3 This position is related directly to the court's
textual analysis and can be reduced to a flat assertion that the court did
not believe that retirees were intended to be protected by the Act. Such
a view avoids rather than answers the assertion that this subject consti-
tutes a threat to industrial peace. Further, the court doubted that the
subject is suited to collective bargaining at all or, in any event, that the
union is the appropriate vehicle for such collective bargaining. First, the
court reasoned that collective bargaining would destroy the security that
the retiree has with a vested contract right because benefits could be
decreased through bargaining as well as increased; second, it feared that
union negotiators would be likely to favor the interests of active dues
paying members over those of the retired employees. It should be noted,
however, that the security of a vested contract right may well be minimal,
particularly where the enforcement of that right depends on the resources
of the individual rather than the resources of a group.3" Additionally, it
should be noted that the representative of a bargaining unit has the duty
to fairly represent the interests of all members of that unit.40 Moreover,
there seems to be no advantage to anyone in excluding retirees from the
unit since the economic power of the retirees eventualy rests on the co-
operation of the active employees and since it will certainly be simpler for
the company to deal with one union rather than two.
80 Id.
"See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 71 L.R.R.M. 1433, 1437 (1969),
and authorities cited there.
427 F.2d at 946.
8' Even where the employer performs his obligation voluntarily, the security
of a vested right to a fixed payment may be slight in periods of continuing inflation.
Based on the Consumer Price Index, a worker who retired in 1959 with a food
budget of one hundred dollars per month would have had to pay 129.80 dollars
for the same food in October, 1969, and his health costs would be 56.9 per cent
higher than when he retired. See U.S. BUREAU Or LABOR STATISTICS, MONTHLY
LABOR RE iEw, Dec., 1969, at 100.
,' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
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A determination that the retired employees in this case are covered
by the Act and that their benefits are mandatory subjects of bargaining
raises quite a few questions that neither the Board nor the court has
answered. For example; does the principle apply to all industrial pen-
sioners or only to those pensioned pursuant to a collectively bargained
contract; will pensioners now be allowed to participate in certification
elections, and, if so, to what extent; may the parties bargain for a decrease
in benefits, and may the employer decrease them if there is an impasse in
bargaining? No reason appears why these questions must be settled before
they arise in an actual case and, thus, the existence of these and other
questions should not prevent affirmance of the Board's decision.
The court set forth no convincing arguments that the Board's decision
will not effectuate the policies of the Act unless one accepts the premise
that retirees were never intended to be protected by the Act. It is difficult
to say that the Board's position is unreasonable or even unsupported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, in a close case such as this the court
should defer to the policy determinations of the Board. If the Board has
acted contrary to the will of Congress, Congress has the power to overrule
the Board.
GEORGE S. KING, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-What Is the Range of Compensable
Consequences of A Work-Related Injury?
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Starr v. Charlotte Paper Co.'
recently considered the extent to which an employer, liable for the first
injury, may be held accountable under the North Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act for secondary injuries subsequently incurred by its
former employee. On October 8, 1963, while employed by the defendant,
Starr suffered a spinal injury causing total paralysis from the waist down.
In lieu of weekly compensation benefits, Starr settled with the employer
for thirty-five thousand dollars. The North Carolina Industrial Com-
mission entered an order approving the settlement with the exception
that it was not in satisfaction of subsequent hospital and nursing expenses
incurred as a result of the injury.
Due to his condition, Starr could move about only with the aid of a
wheelchair and had frequent muscle spasms in his legs. On March 17,
'8 N.C. App. 604, 175 S.E.2d 342, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 112, - S.E.2d -
(1970).
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1969, six years after the first injury, he was awakened by muscle spasms
which he managed to quiet by massaging his legs. The claimant then lit
a cigarette. When his legs again began to contract, he placed the cigarette
in an ash tray on his wheelchair beside the bed and again massaged his
legs. After he drifted off to sleep, his sheets came into contact with the
cigarette and began smoldering. Starr was finally awakened by the smell
of smoke but by this time had suffered second and third degree burns over
the lower half of his body, which resulted in his being hospitalized for
seventy-three days.
The claimant brought a claim against his former employer for the
hospital expenses and was awarded compensation by the Industrial Com-
mission. Charlotte Paper Co. appealed, charging that the previous acci-
dent was not the proximate cause of the claimant's subsequent injuries, but
that they were proximately caused by his smoking in bed. In affirming
the award, the North Carolina Court of Appeals relied on a liberal con-
struction of the workmen's compensation act to find that the injury "arose
out of" the employment.' Noting that the claimant's failure to properly
extinguish the cigarette was a "simple act of forgetfulness,"' the court
stated that recovery was allowed even when the employment was not the
"sole causative force"4 of an injury. In addition, the court held that
every direct and natural consequence of a prior injury is compensable
unless there has been an intervening cause attributable to "claimant's own
intentional conduct."5 Any negligence on the part of the claimant not
amounting to intentional conduct was thus disregarded.'
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act allows recovery
for "injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employ-
ments."'7 "Arising out of" as used in the act requires that the injury have
its origin in the employment," be traceable to the employment,9 or spring
from the employment."0 Thus, an injury occurring subsequent in time to
2Id. at 609-10, 175 S.E.2d at 346.
8Id.
'Id.
Id. at 611, 175 S.E.2d at 347.6Id.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-2(6) (1965).
' Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963);
Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 91, 63 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1951).9Horn v. Sandhill Furn. Co., 245 N.C. 173, 176, 95 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1956);
Poteete v. North State Pyrophyllite Co., 240 N.C. 561, 564, 82 S.E.2d 693, 694




the prior compensable injury would have its origin in the employment if
there were "some causal relation"11 between the two injuries. One cause
of Starr's bums was the muscle spasms that awakened him and arguably
led to his failure to extinguish the cigarette. Furthermore, he would have
been awakened by the burning of his flesh had he any feeling in his legs. 2
Thus, there was "some causal relation" between the injury and the prior
compensable injury, so that the bums could be said to have "arisen out
of the employment."
The real difficulty of analysis in statutory terms is encountered when
the "in the course of the employment" inquiry is made. "In the course of
the employment' refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the
accident.'" Because secondary injuries of the type under consideration
here do not occur in the job context, some courts limit their inquiry to a
determination of whether the injury arose out of the employment, 4 in-
dicating that all that is necessary for recovery for subsequent injuries is
caustion in the but-for sense. "So long as the original injury operates even
in part as a contributing factor [of the second injury] it establishes liabil-
ity."' 5 Using this language, recovery for the subsequent swimming death
of a quadruple amputee could be allowed if his limbs had been lost as a
result of a prior compensable injury. A man with a broken hand could
recover for re-injury incurred as a result of a boxing match,' or one
suffering from vertigo as a result of a prior injury could recover for sub-
sequently falling off a ladder.' If some inquiry in addition to "arising
out of the employment" is not made, recovery for the off-the-job injury
will be broader than for the original injury,'8 and workmen's compensation
11Id.128 N.C. App. at 609, 175 S.E.2d at 346.12Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1952).
'
4 See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 1 Cal. Rptr. 73,
176 Cal. App. 2d 862 (1959); Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577,
215 N.Y.S. 562 (Sup. Ct 1926).
1 State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 176 Cal. App. 2d 862, -
1 Cal. Rptr. 73, 78 (1959).
" 1 A. LARSON, LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 13.11, at 192.65-.66
(1968) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
17 Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577, 215 N.Y.S. 562 (Sup.
Ct. 1926). See also Note, Workmai's Compensation: Arising out of Employment:
Chain of Causation between Compensable Injury and Subsequent Injury, Aggrava-
tion or Reinjury: Negligence of Worknan as Independent Interveninq Case:
Swanson v. Willians & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61 (3d Dep't 1951),
aff'd without opinion, 304 N.Y. 624, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1952), 38 CORNELL L.Q. 99
(1952).
8 Recovery is not allowed for the original injury if it was occasioned by intoxica-
tion or if it was willfully inflicted. If "arising out of the employment" is the only
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will be extended into the proscribed field of general health and accident in-
surance. 19
Due to the nonapplicability of the "in the course of the employment"
inquiry to subsequent off-the-job injuries and the recognition that all
secondary injuries were not intended to be compensable,20 courts have
sought some concept to limit the employer's liability for a causally related
injury.2' Accordingly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, and most
other courts considering the problem, require that in addition to "some
causal relation" the subsequent injury be proximately caused by the
prior compensable injury.' "The proximate cause doctrine ... requires
that the original injury be one of the direct and natural causes of the
subsequent injury,"'' or compensation will be denied.24
Thus, there is a reentry of common law proximate cause into the
formula for recovery under the workmen's compensation acts. One
element of proximate causation is foreseeability. Foreseeability was elim-
inated by the North Carolina act as a requirement for compensation for
on-the-job injuries25 because it is
requirement for compensability for a subsequent injury, recovery might be allowed
where it was in part occasioned by the employee's intoxication under a literal
application of this language. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1965).9 Workmen's Compensation Acts are not to be construed so liberally as to pro-
vide general health and accident insurance. Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist
Church, 267 N.C. 111, 115, 147 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1966); Martin v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 5 N.C. App. 37, 41, 167 S.E.2d 790, 792-93 (1969). See generally Note, 38
CORNELL L.Q., supra note 17, at 103-04.20 See authorities cited note 19 supra.
"_Arguably, there are several provisions in the North Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act that evidence a legislative intent that subsequent injuries not be
compensable at all. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(a) (1965) (all claims are barred
unless filed within two years of a compensable accident); § 97-24(c) (1965) (all
records of the Industrial Commission can be destroyed five years after all reports
are filed); § 97-47 (1965) (an employee can move for review of the award if
there has been a change in his condition). See also Lee v. Roses 5-10-250 Stores,
205 N.C. 310, 171 S.E. 87 (1953).
" See, e.g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. Hill, 201 Md. 630, 636, 95 A.2d 84, 87 (1953);
Dickerson v. Essex Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 516, -, 157 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Gower v. Mackes, 184 Pa. Super. 41, 45-46, 132 A.2d 880, 882 (1957).
8 N.C. App. at 610, 175 S.E.2d at 347. See also Coble v. Player Realty &
Constr. Co., North Carolina Industrial Acc. Comm'n Docket No. A-7243 (1951).
" See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Polar Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Ind. App. 321, 79 N.E.2d 422
(1948); Adkins v. Rives Plating Corp., 338 Mich. 265, 61 N.W.2d 117 (1953);
Sullivan v. B&A Constr., Inc., 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954). See also
Note, Workmenw's Compensation--Accident or Injury and Consequences Thereof-
Subsequent Injuries, 19 U. Cxx. L. Rxv. 304, 305 (1950).
" North Carolina does not require that the original injury be foreseeable. See,
e.g., Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963);
Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 433, 53 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1949); Ashley v. F-W
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out of place in compensation law because, as developed in tort law, it
[is] a concept which [is] . .. thoroughly suffused with the idea of
fault; that is, it [is] a theory of causation designed to bring about a
just result when starting from an act containing some element of fault.
The primary test of legal cause in the United States is foresee-
ability . . . . [b]ut foreseeability has no relevance if one is not in-
terested in the culpability of the actor's conduct.26
Since the fault of the employer is equally irrelevant in the context of
secondary injuries, common law foreseeability has no place in the deter-
mination of compensability. With the dismissal of foreseeability, proximate
cause is limited to meaning the absence of an intervening cause.2 7
Once the doctrine of intervening cause raises its head, the employee's
negligence as an intervening cause must be reckoned with even though the
workmen's compensation acts eliminated any inquiry into negligence in
the formula for recovery. "[N]ot even gross negligence is [to be] a
defense to a compensation claim."2  Courts have avoided this seemingly
anomalous situation by asserting that the inquiry into employee negligence
is not made to bar recovery for contributory negligence but to determine
the legal cause of the claimant's injury-his own intervening negligence
or the prior injury.2 9 Accordingly, most courts have required something
more than mere negligence by the employee to break the chain of causation
and relieve the employer of liability.s0 What constitutes mere negligence
is determinative of liability in most subsequent injury cases. Thus, the
court of appeals in Starr held that Starr's failure to extinguish his
cigarette was a "simple act of forgetfulness . . . insufficient to break the
chain of causation between the original injury and the burns sustained.""1
The assertion that an inquiry into the claimant's negligence is not
made to deny recovery for contributory negligence but to determine if
the negligence is the legal cause of the injury provides a weak justification
Chevrolet Co., 222 N.C. 25, 27, 21 S.E.2d 834, 835 (1942). See also 5 J. STRONG,
NORTH CAnoLINA INDEx 2D Master & Servant § 55, at 399-400 (1968).
26 Larson, Range of Compensable Consequences in Workman's Compensation,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 610 (1970).
"
7 Note, 19 U. CIN. L. REv., supra note 24, at 305.
"
8Hartley v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128 S.E.2d 598,
600 (1962).2 3 Note, 38 CORNELL L.Q., supra note 17, at 101.
308 N.C. App. at 610, 175 S.E.2d at 346 (simple act of forgetfullness). Accord,
Swanson v. Williams & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, -, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61, 66 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (carelessness or error in judgment); Anderson v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n,
116 Wash. 421, 423, 199 P. 747, 748 (1921) (imprudence). See generay, LARSON§ 13.12, at 192.76. But see Note, 30 TENN. L. Rnv. 322, 324 (1963).
"18 N.C. App. at 609-10, 175 S.E.2d at 346.
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for insinuating negligence back into the formula for recovery. If the
question as to whether the claimant's negligence was an intervening or only
a contributing cause is a guide to recovery, why should the same inquiry
not be made in regard to on-the-job injuries? The court, if it found the
claimant's negligence an intervening cause, could report that it was denying
recovery because the negligence and not the job caused the injury. How-
ever, as we have seen, even gross intervening negligence will not prevent
recovery for one-the-job injuries.32
If the concept of proximate causation cannot be tested by inquiry into
foreseeability or by the use of intervening causation,83 it is useless in
defining the situations where compensation for causally related subsequent
injuries should be allowed. 4 Nevertheless, it could hardly be said that
the act was intended to compensate the employee for every secondary in-
jury suffered due to the interaction of the previous injury and sub-
sequent conduct and events.35 The North Carolina Workmen's Com-
pensation Act relieves the employer from responsibility for the original
injury if it was occasioned by the employee's intoxication or if he will-
fully inflicted the injury on himself. 0 Arguably then, some limitation
should be placed on the employer's liability for a subsequent injury even
where there is some causal relation to the prior injury. For example,
if an employee became a quadruple amputee as a result of a prior com-
pensable injury and later attempted to swim the English Channel, it
would be ludicrous to hold the employer liable for his drowning death.
If neither the traditional "in the course of the employment" inquiry
nor the concept of proximate cause is fitted to determining the range of
compensable consequences of a prior, causally related compensable injury,
how is the court to define those situations where such injuries will be
" See, e.g., Hartley v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128
S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962); Howell v. Standard Ice & Fuel Co., 226 N.C. 730, 732,
40 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1946).
"' This is not to imply that foreseeability and intervening causation are preclusive
tests of proximate cause. They are, however, the traditonal tests used to insert
some certainty into the concept. Because most courts rely on these terms, they
will be relied on here.
" The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act does not speak of prox-
imate cause as a test of liability. Conjecturally, it might have been intentionally
avoided. For that reason alone, the term should be avoided in workmen's com-
pensation cases.
" "[B]ecause of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point." Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., dis-
senting).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1965).
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compensable? Professor Larson has been one of the few commentators to
address himself to this problem.3 7 His solution is to divide all employee
conduct occurring subsequent to the first compensable injury into two
categories: that necessarily and reasonably undertaken because of the
prior injury" and that undertaken for other reasons.3 9 The former cat-
egory is delineated as "quasi [in the] course of [the] employment""0
activity, the latter, non-"quasi [in the] course of." The range of com-
pensable consequences for "quasi in the course of" activity extends to
any subsequent injury not incurred as a result of the claimant's intentional
conduct."1 Thus, there would be recovery for injuries incurred during
a trip to the doctor's office for treatment of a prior injury even if the
claimant was negligent in some aspect of the trip. If the activity in which
the claimant was engaged at the time of the second injury were not
undertaken because of the prior injury, recovery would be denied by the
Larson rule if there were any culpability greater than "mere" negli-
gence.4" Professor Larson's use of intentional and negligent conduct as
determining the outer limits of the range of compensable consequences
for a work-related injury still focuses the court's attention on intervening
and thus proximate causation as a limitation on recovery. Such an analysis
is subject to the same criticism as a proximate cause inquiry unrefined by
"quasi course of" language.43
Most courts have recognized that industry should bear the burden for
secondary injuries where the causal relation is sufficiently strong44 and
where the employee was not injured while engaged in activity highly
dangerous for one in his condition.4" Compensation for second injuries
is denied where there is no proof of any causal relation or where claimant
was reinjured while engaged in conduct highly unreasonable for one in
his condition.4 Denial of compensation in the first situation can best be
"'See 1 LmsoN §§ 13.00-.12.
88 Id.
I' Id. § 13.11, at 192.70-71.
'OId. at 192.68.
.Id.
4 Professor Larson relates that it takes something more than mere carelessness
on the part of the employee to relieve the employer of liability even though the em-
ployee is outside the "quasi-course" of the employment. Id. at 192.70-.71.8 See pp. 587-88 supra.
" Cf. 1 LARSON § 13.11, at 192.67.
" Adkins v. Rives Plating Corp., 338 Mich. 265, 272, 61 N.W.2d 117, 120
(1953) ; Jones v. Huey, 210 Tenn. 162, 167, 357 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1962) ; McDougle
v. Department of Labor & Indus., 64 Wash. 2d 640, 644, 393 P.2d 631, 635 (1964).
" See authorities cited note 45 supra.
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explained in terms of lack of sufficient causal relation to hold that the
injury arose out of the employment. The courts usually deny liability
in the latter situation after a determination that the activity in which
the claimant was engaged when injured was not a normal one for a
person in his condition. In proximate cause terms the activity would be
called intervening negligence, and compensation would therefore be denied.
However, instead of couching the inquiry in terms of proximate causation,
less confusion and more consistent results4 7 would be achieved if the
limitation were versed in the very terms by which it is reached, i.e., was
the activity a normal one for a person placed in plaintiff's physical and
mental condition by the prior compensable injury.4" This inquiry may seem
a return to the concept of foreseeability, condemned in workmen's com-
pensation law ;49 however, it does not require that the claimants's second
injury be foreseen by either him or the employer. Thus to be com-
pensable, the injury must occur during participation in activities that,
viewed in retrospect, are normal and expected and there must be some
causal relation between the two injuries.
The suggested method of limiting recovery would eliminate the con-
fusion 0 resulting from an analysis based on proximate cause although
the end result in terms of liability may be the same. Proximate cause
is essentially a policy determination as to whether legal responsibility
' The differences as to what the term "proximate cause" means to different
courts is shown by the wide divergence in results on similar fact situations in work-
men's compensation cases. Compare Wallace v. Judd Brown Constr. Co., 269 Minn.
455, 131 N.W.2d 540 (1964), with Prentice v. Weeks, 239 App. Div. 227, 267
N.Y.S. 849 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 507, 191 N.E. 538 (1933); Adkins v. Rives
Plating Corp., 338 Mich. 265, 61 N.W.2d 117 (1953), with Colvin v. Emmons &
Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577, 215 N.Y.S. 562 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ; Fischer v. R. Hoe
& Co., 224 App. Div. 335, 230 N.Y.S. 755 (Sup. Ct. 1928), with Whiting-Mead
Commercial Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 178 Cal. 505, 173 P. 1105 (1918).
,' This test is closely akin to the "direct and natural result" of a prior com-
pensable injury formulation announced in Starr. It is superior, however, because
it diverts the court from all mention of proximate cause.
"' See pp. 586-87 supra.
"The confusion caused the court by use of the concept of proximate causation
as a limitation on recovery, even when the test is couched in terms of "quasi-
course" of the employment, can be seen in Starr. There, the court cited Larson's
treatise for the proposition that a claimant is allowed recovery for all consequences
of his prior injury unless they occurred as a result of his intentional conduct. 8 N.C.
App. at 611, 175 S.E.2d at 347. Accordingly, Starr's smoking in bed was held not to
be an intervening cause of the bums. Professor Larson, however, would require
that the claimant's smoking in bed be an activity reasonably and necessarily under-
taken because of the prior compensable injury or anything greater than the claim-
ant's mere negligence would bar recovery. 1 Larsen § 13.12, at 192.76. The court,
however, made no finding that Starr's smoking in bed was reasonable or necessary.
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should be imposed on one person for injuries incurred by another.5 Rather
than making this policy determination by using proximate cause with its
myriad of meanings52 and connotation of fault,13 the court should ascertain
whether the injury had sufficient causal relation to the prior injury and
subsequently occurred in the course of activities normally expected to be
undertaken by one in the claimant's condition. 4 Thus, in Starr, it might
be said that smoking in bed was a normal activity for a paraplegic. Fur-
thermore it is to be expected that an injured employee will engage in a
certain amount of careless or even negligent activity. It is only when he
embarks on a course of conduct that is highly unreasonable for one in his
condition that he departs from the course of normal activities.
Even though, arguably, Starr was correctly decided,55 the court should
not use a highly technical and amorphous term such as proximate cause
to determine the range of compensable consequences in workmen's com-
pensation cases. If the use of proximate cause is not abandoned, the
doctrines of tort law and workmen's compensation law will eventually
fuse even though the avoidance of the common law concepts was one of the
main justifications for the original passage of the workmen's compensa-
tion acts.56
C. Hl. POPE, JR.
Cf. W. PROSSER, LAw oF TORTS § 49, at 282 (3d ed. 1964).See note 47 supra.
' See note 26 supra.
""Normal and expected" are used here not as a suggestion that foreseeability
is required but in the sense that in retrospect the claimant's conduct is not sur-
prising.
" Whether Starr's recovery should have been allowed hinges on whether smoking
in bed was a normal and expected activity for a person subject to having muscle
spasms. A paraplegic could not be expected to get out of bed every time he
smoked a cigarette.
"' Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 726, 153 S.E. 266, 268(1930).
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